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Summary  findings
Grootaert  and Narayan empirically estimate the impact  effect of social capital on household welfare was found
of social capital on household welfare in Bolivia - where  to be 2.5 times that of human capital. Increasing the
they found 67 different types of local associations. They  average educational endowment of each adult in the
focus on household memberships in local associations as  household by one year (about a 25-percent increase)
being especially relevant to daily decisions that affect  would increase per capita household spending 4.2
household welfare and consumption.  percent;  a similar increase in the social capital
On average, households belong to 1.4 groups and  endowment would increase spending 9 to 10.5 percent.
associations: 62 percent belong to agrarian syndicates, 16  They measured social capital along six dimensions:
percent to production  groups, 13 percent to social  density of memberships, internal heterogeneity of
service groups, and  10 percent to education and health  associations (by gender, age, education, religion, etc.),
groups. Smaller numbers belong to religious and  meeting attendance, active participation in
government groups.  decisionmaking, payment of dues (in cash and in kind),
Agrarian syndicates, created by government decree in  and community orientation.  The strongest effect came
1952, are now viewed mainly as community-initiated  from number of memberships. Active memberslhip in an
institutions to manage communal resources. They have  agrarian syndicate is associated with an average 11.5
been registered as legal entities to work closely with  percent increase in household spending. Membership in
municipalities to represent the interests and priorities of  another local association is associated with a 5.3-percent
local people in municipal decisionmaking.  higher spending level.
The effects of social capital operate through  (at least)  Empirical results partly confirm the hypothesis that
three mechanisms: sharing of information among  social capital provides long-term benefits such as better
association members; the reduction of opportunistic  access to credit and a higher level of trust in the
behavior; and better collective decisionmaking. The  community as a source of assistance in case of need.
This paper-a  joint product of the Social Development Department  and the  Poverty Division, Poverty Reduction and
Economic Management Network-is  part of a larger effort in the Bank to understand better the role of local institutions,
and social capital in general, for poverty reduction.. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H
Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Gracie Ochieng, room MC5-410, telephone 202-473-1123,  fax 202-
522-3247, email address gochieng@(worldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http:/
/econ.worldbank.org.  The authors  may be contacted  at cgrootaert(kworldbank.org  or dnarayan@worldbank.org.  July
2001.  (66 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to  encourage the exchange of  ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the namzes  of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. The) do not  necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
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ii1.  INTRODUCTION:  LOCAL  INSTITUTIONS  AND  SOCIAL  CAPITAL
Of every  four Bolivians, three are Indians
Xavier Alb6, 1994
With decentralization the current rage  in  development, the  importance  of  local  level
institutions  should reach new heights.  Yet, the primary  focus in  the  decentralization
literature is  on  the  structures and  functions of  devolved  formal  authorities.  Formal
government systems are  embedded in  the local  social organizational context.  Hence
understanding how and when local governments become inclusive and function effectively
in  basic service provision  and  poverty reduction, requires  understanding the  interplay
between the formal and informal institutions and the interplay between history, politics and
changes in social organization over time.  This requires overlaying quantitative data with
historical qualitative data.  The Local Level Institutions (LLI) Study in Bolivia, provides a
particularly rich context to disentangle these relationships.
We combine two rich data sets both of which were collected as part of the LLI
Study.  The  qualitative  data  explore  the  history,  politics  and  dynamics  of  local
associations, municipal government, and the history and nature of social relations in four
different municipalities: Mizque, Charagua, Tiahuanacu and  Villa Serrano.  We use  a
quantitative data set derived from a household survey to develop indices of social capital
and econometric techniques to explore linkages between poverty and social capital at the
household and  community level in the same four municipalities.  Both data sets were
created by the Sinergia group in Bolivia led by  Godofredo Sandoval.  We also make
extensive use of their report Grassroots Organizations and Local Development in Bolivia
written by Sandoval and associates (1998).
We draw four main conclusions. First, social capital measured by memberships in
agrarian syndicates and other associations matters for poverty reduction.  Some dimensions
of social capital or characteristics of groups are more central than others.  Household and
village social capital matters but so does bridging or linking social capital.  As an asset,
social  capital matters  more  for the poor  than the non-poor  and  has greater  effect  on
household welfare than investment in primary education.  Households with higher social
capital  are  likely  to  have  more permanent physical  assets  which  help  them  smooth
consumption during periods of income fluctuation.  They are more likely to participate in
collective action and be able to draw on community resources in times of need.
Second,  there  is  a  relation  of  complementarity  and  substitution  between  the
informal and formal institutions.  At the municipal level, the relationship between social
capital and welfare is modified by the nature and presence of other formal institutions.
Thus, Mizque  achieves complementarity between  strong traditional  institutions,  strong
supra-community linkage organizations, and effective municipal government.  Mizque is
also the most prosperous of the four municipalities. On the other extreme is Villa Serrano,
3in which the traditional institutions are weak and exclude the poor, the poor belong to other
local associations to cope with poverty, and there are weak linkage organizations and an
ineffective municipal govermnent.  Villa Serrano is the poorest of the four municipalities.
Charagua, which has managed a renewal of supra-community indigenous organizations,
has an  effective municipal government even though it  is  dominated by the  elite, and
experiences higher levels of economic prosperity.
Third, history,  politics  and  the existing  social  and  power  structures have  far-
reaching effects on social capital formation.  However, when there are deep changes in
law, politics, economic structure and markets, changes in social capital formation which
lead to poverty reduction are possible.  The strategy has to be context specific.  Over the
long run NGOs and other external agents can play a critical role in bringing about positive
changes in poverty-reducing social capital.  The form of assistance is context-specific and
needs to be derived from a thorough diagnosis of the local social, political, institutional
and economic context situated in the broader national context.
Fourth,  the  degree  of  access to  markets  and  ease  of  communication through
proximity to major roads and access to electricity affects both economic opportunities and
social capital formation.  When economic opportunities are low in the local areas, people
migrate  to  cities  seeking  new  sources  of  income.  This  affects  organizational  life.
However, proximity to cities, such as in Tiahuanacu, results in migrants maintaining close
contact with the local areas.  Organizational life seems to be most negatively affected in
areas of low economic potential, with migration into cities and physical isolation.  This is
most evident in Villa Serrano.  However, as new opportunities open up in local areas,
communities witness reverse migration, as many indigenous groups prefer to live in their
own communities where their tradition, identity and culture are honored.  This is clearest
in Charagua.
42.  POVERTY,  ETHNICITY  AND  GOVERNANCE  IN BOLIVIA
Bolivia,  with  a  population  of  7.2 million,  is  a  poor  country  with  great  ethnic  and
geographic  diversity.  Based  on  an  index  of  unsatisfied  basic  needs'  set  in  1992,
approximately 70% of the population was classified poor.  Overall, 94% of  the rural
population was classified poor, compared to 98% in 1976.  In addition, among the poor,
about 90% were classified as being below the extreme poverty line.  In terms of urban
poverty, while 50% of the population was classified poor in 1992, the number was 65% in
1976 (World Bank, 1996).
Radical structural adjustment measures in the 1980's consisting of liberalization of
most prices, privatization, reform of public enterprises and closing of unprofitable mines,
helped curtail hyper-inflation.  It also  led to  increased migration to  the cities (30,000
miners were laid off) and did little for poverty reduction in the rural areas.
Seventy percent of the population is indigenous.  There is great overlap between
being poor and being indigenous.  In rural areas, 90% of the population is indigenous,
primarily Aymara and Quechua, who traditionally live in the altiplano and the valley of the
high  Andes.  Poverty  and  extreme poverty  are  more  prevalent  in  Aymara  speaking
households.  Another 30 to 40 ethnic and language groups are spread across the altiplano
and lowlands of Eastern and Northern Bolivia (Strobele-Gregor, 1994, Alb6, 1994).
According to  World Bank  (1996) estimates,  1) being indigenous increases the
probability of being poor by about 14%; 2) each additional child increases the probability
of being poor by 6.5%; 3) an unemployed household head increases the probability of
being poor by about 14%; and 4) each additional year of schooling reduced the probability
of being poor significantly. In all studies, indigenous women appear the worst off on every
measure of basic needs.
Bolivia has  an  unequal distribution of  income, which  is  severe even by Latin
American standards.  This inequality has not improved over time (Birdsall et al. 1998). In
a cross-country analysis, Birdsall and Londofio (1997) have shown that the greater the
initial  inequality  in  land  and  education, the  lower  the  growth  rates  experienced by
countries.  The impact of initial inequality on income growth more than doubles when the
sample is restricted only to poor countries.
Most writers on Bolivia agree that Bolivian society since 1532 has been a highly
stratified dual society of Spaniards and Indians.  Following independence in  1825, the
Bolivian state was dominated by a small oligarchy of tin-mining interests until the defeat
in the Chaco War against Paraguay in the 1930s (Alb6, 1994; Garcia Arganaras, 1992).
This defeat proved to  be  so traumatic that  it generated widespread questioning of the
The implied  rural poverty  line was 158.9  Bs per month  (59%  of the urban poverty  line) and the
extreme  poverty line in rural areas was 119.2 Bs per person per month (80% of the urban
equivalent).
5landed and mining interests ruling both  state and society.  It  sowed the  seeds for the
emergence of the MNR  (Movimiento Nacionalista Revoluci6nario) - a  revolutionary
alliance of urban traders, peasants, and mine-workers. The 1952 agrarian reform was part
of  this  process  whereby  land  was  redistributed,  mines  nationalized  and  peasant
organizations, the sindicatos, 'incorporated'  into the state.  The goal was a nation state
with the culture of the Mestizo, with the Indians and half-Indians adopting the culture of
the ruling society and becoming culturally white (Alb6, 1994). The land redistribution was
not equally successful everywhere and in many areas haciendas remained intact (Str6bele-
Gregor, 1996).
It  was only  in  the early  1980's  that Bolivia moved from  a  military state to  a
democratic state.  The 1980's marked the beginning of an adoption of neoliberal market-
based economic strategies and the gradual consolidation of democracy (Albro, 1998). The
growing gap between ideology and a reality which denied basic rights, fostered widespread
discrimination and excluded indigenous groups from all spheres of social, political and
economic life, led gradually to the emergence of cultural identity movements, identity
politics and demands for autonomous organizations and cultural pluralism.  In the early
1970's the Katarista movement emerged among the Aymara Indians.  The movement was
named in memory of Tupaj Katari, an Aymara leader who led an anticolonial uprising in
1781.  This movement was also the forerunner of the first independent national peasant
confederation,  the  CSUTCB,  (Confederaci6n Unica  de  Trabajadores  Campesinos  de
Bolivia) established in 1979.  While the Katarista movement experienced internal rifts and
difficulties in organizing, the ideas they espoused, including the creation of a plurinational
state, gained ground (Alb6, 1995). In the late 1980's indigenous organizations emerged in
the lowlands of eastern Bolivia, and in 1991 the Coordinator of Indigenous Peoples of the
Beni led the well-publicized "March for Territory and Dignity" in which 12 ethnic groups
marched  700  kilometers  through  the jungle  and  the  snow-capped  Andes to  La  Paz,
captivating the country's  attention for 40 days and creating national awareness of their
issues (Alb6, 1995). But while the indigenous groups created political parties, they did not
do well at the polls.  This was due to lack of funds, parochial organization and internal
divisions.  Within the Katarista movement, it was Victor Hugo Cardenas, an Aymara and
Katarista movement leader since 1978 who came to the fore.  A one-time parliamentarian,
Cardenas was invited to share a presidential ticket with Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada to
form a coalition with the MNR for the 1993 election.  The MNR alliance with the MRTKL
(Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberaci6n) won the election, and an Aymara
Indian became a Vice-President for the first time.
Having instituted structural economic reforms in the 1980's  and having won the
1993 elections, the  MNR  government, under  the leadership  of  President  Sanchez de
Lozado,  undertook a  second  generation of  reforms  to  deepen  economic changes  and
democracy and to  address the issues of inequality resulting  from 500  years of  ethnic
exclusion.
In a radical step to address rural poverty issues, Bolivia promulgated the Law of
Popular  Participation  (Ley  de  Participaci6n  Popular,  LPP)  in  1994,  and  the
Decentralization Law (Ley de Descentralizaci6n Administrativa, LDA)  in  1995, which
gave resources and responsibilities to municipalities and structured the involvement of
6local  grassroots  organizations  in  the  planning,  implementation  and  monitoring  of
municipal  government. 2 Almost overnight, Bolivia  moved from  a  highly centralized
political,  administrative  and  economic  state,  to  a  devolved  state  consisting  of  311
municipalities, 248 of which were newly created.  Over 30% of the municipalities were
small and consisted of less than 5,000 people (Tuchschneider, 1998).  Whereas before the
reform the three main cities received 84% of all devolved funds while the majority of rural
communities received nothing, after the reform the share of the three cities fell to 29% and
provincial and rural area budgets increased from 42% to over 3000% (Faguet, 1998). The
criteria  of  allocation  of  resources  to  different  areas  shifted  from  one  of  political
consideration to allocation based on population.  Title to local infrastructure and future
provision of basic services became a municipal responsibility.  Most importantly, the LPP
recognized over 15,000 existing territorial organizations, indigenous organizations, peasant
organizations  and  neighborhood councils  as  legitimate  grassroots  organizations  and
incorporated them into  1,600 Oversight Vigilance Committees (OTBs) (Tuchschneider,
1998).  To keep municipalities accountable, the Oversight Committees were to channel
local citizen preferences and demands and provide independent oversight over municipal
resource allocation decisions and actions. Thus, for the first time in Bolivia, OTBs becarne
the chief local mechanism for ensuring local government accountability.
Bolivia is also characterized by great regional differences in social structure, in the
degree of harmony and conflict and the nature of social relations between indigenous and
Spanish populations, the degree of inclusion of indigenous groups in formal systems of
governance, the degree  of social  cohesion among indigenous  groups, the presence  of
'linkage' organizations, the degree of linkage to markets and the presence of NGOs. These
factors comprise the social capital of an area and influence the extent to which OTBs can
function effectively to create responsive municipal governments.  It is against this history
of repression, exclusion, and radical economic and social restructuring that the results from
our study need to be considered.
2  A third law enacted at that time relates to privatization of public enterprises, and stipulated that half the
proceeds from the sales will be used to create a national pension fund and solidarity  bonds for all
Bolivians above age 21. The educational system will also be updated to reflect the cultural and linguistic
diversity of Bolivia.
73. THE LocAL  LEVEL INSTITUTIONS STUDY AND THE DATA SET
The data  set  for  this  paper  comes from  the Local  Level Institutions  (LLI)  Study,  a
comparative study for three countries (Bolivia, Burkina Faso and Indonesia), that aims to
investigate the role of  local  institutions in providing service delivery and  in  affecting
welfare and poverty outcomes. 3 Data were collected at the community, the district and the
household level.
At the level of the community, interviews with focus groups of households and with
community  leaders  were  held  to  establish  a  map  of  functioning  institutions  in  the
community. Three instruments were used:
*  Informnation  on community services was obtained through interviews with key
informants such as the village chief, teacher, health provider, etc.  This was
supplemented  with  information  on  the  local  economy  (infrastructure  and
distance  to  markets),  local  society (ethnic/religious composition)  and  local
institutions.
*  Community services were also discussed with groups of households, with the
objective of learning the community's perspective on the quality of service, its
experience  with  collective  action,  and  its  views  on  local  institutions  and
development projects.
a  For the most important local institutions, interviews were held with leaders and
members, as well as non-members, in order to get a balanced view of the role of
the institutions in the village, their development over time, their main activities,
relations with other institutions and government, and their main strengths and
weaknesses.
At the  district  level  (defined  as  the administrative level  above the  village or
community), data  were  collected  concerning  the  extent  of  service  coverage  and  the
institutional arrangements for the provision of services.  Information was also obtained
about the general  functioning of  the district administration and  its  relation with  civic
organizations, through interviews with general and sectoral managers at the district level.
The third and critical part of the data collection was a household survey that aimed
to capture households'  actual participation in local institutions, their use of services, and
information that identifies the welfare level of households and their coping strategies.  The
questionnaire consisted of six sections:
The objectives of the Local Level Institutions Study and the questionnaires are further discussed in World
Bank (1998).
8*  demographic information on household members
*  participation in local institutions
*  characteristics of the most important groups
*  service provision profiles
*  perceptions of community trust and collaboration
*  household economy and coping strategies.
The limited resources available did not make possible a sampling framework such
that the studies would be representative for the countries at the national level.  Instead,
three or four areas were selected in each country (municipalities in Bolivia, provinces in
Burkina Faso and Indonesia), which represent different economic, social and institutional
environments. In  the  case of  Bolivia,  the  collected  data  covered  four  municipalities
("municipios"): Charagua, Mizque, Tiahuanacu and Villa Serrano.
Bolivia  is  a  country  with  a  strong  geographical  and  cultural  heterogeneity.
Climate, ecology and altitude vary significantly, ranging from the eastern plains at about
1,000 meters above sea level, to the highlands at altitudes approaching 4,000 meters above
sea level.  As already discussed, Bolivia is a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual country.  The
three most important indigenous groups are the Aymara who live in the highlands, the
Quechua who inhabit the valleys, and the Guarani in the  eastern lowlands.  The four
selected municipalities cover the main ecological zones of Bolivia as well as its principal
indigenous groups.
Municipality Characteristics 4
Mizque, population  20,000, is located in Bolivia's  central valleys in  the Cochabamba
department at about 2,200 meters above sea level (Table 1).  The climate is hot and the
area is subject to periods of drought.  It is inhabited by Quechua campesinos who farm
intensively on small parcels of land.  Agriculture, irrigated and unirrigated, is the most
important economic activity and there are several irrigation committees to manage water
resources collectively.  Most land tenure has its origin in the adjudication of expropriated
haciendas,  but  in  most  cases,  land  ownership  has  still  not  been  legalized.  Mizque
experiences seasonal migration to Chapare where young men work as day laborers in the
production and processing of coca leaf.  Young women go to  Cochabamba to work as
domestic servants.  Mizque has  a trunk  road that  connects the municipal capital with
Cochabamba, 180 kilometers away.
4  These  descriptions  are summarized  from  Sandoval  et al, 1998.  For full descriptions  see their  report.
9Table 1: Selected Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Study Areas
Charagua  Mizque  Tiahuanacu  Villa  Serrano
Region  Chaco  Plain  Central  Andean  Southern
Valleys  Valleys
Altitude
(meters  above  sea level)  980  2,225  3,870  2,378
Population  18,769  20,170  13,151  12,616
Rural  population  (%)  71%  96%  92%  80%
% of communities  with
primary  school  79%  22%  100%  61%
Number  of health  centers
| and hospitals  16  11  6  7
Source:  Sandoval et al (1998).
Tiahuanacu, population 13,000, is located in the highlands just  an hour away from
the city of La Paz. An asphalt road connects it to the Bolivian capital.  Tiahuanacu has the
best  developed  road  system  of  the  four  provinces  with  secondary  roads  passable
throughout the year.  Cold and arid, Tiahuanacu is located at an altitude of 3,900 meters
above sea level.  It is inhabited by Aymara campesinos who engage in subsistence farming
and dairy production. Even within the municipality, which consists of 41 communities, the
agro-ecological zones  vary  considerably in  agricultural prosperity.  In  this  area, land
reform did result in the break-up of haciendas. Life in Tiahuanacu is dominated by the
proximity to La Paz.  Seasonal and permanent migration anong  the young to La Paz is a
fact of life and is reflected in the fact that 41% of household heads are over 56 years of
age, compared to approximately 20% in the other three municipalities.
Charagua, population  19,000, is located on the plains of Eastern Bolivia  at an
altitude of about 1,000 meters. It is populated by the Guarani who until recently have been
dominated by the Criollo minority.  It is an 8 hour trip by road from the city of Santa Cruz.
Unlike the other municipalities, Charagua has experienced population growth.  This is
because the in-migration of merchants and the poor who come for the cotton harvest has
more than offset the out-migration to Santa Cruz, Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil.  The
Guarani indigenous population lives side by side with hacienda owners engaged in raising
livestock and the exploitation of forests.  Local power is concentrated in the hands of
timber companies and cattle ranchers. The municipality consists of three agro-ecological
zones:  the scrub forest, the foothills and the sandy Chaco plain with very low rainfall and
some of the poorest communities in the municipality.
Villa Serrano, population 13,000, is located in the valleys of southern Bolivia at
about 2,400 meters above sea level. It is 155 miles away from the city of Sucre. Its varied
climate is typical of the many different micro-climates found in the mountainous Andean
countryside.  Its population, although original Quechua, has been largely hispanicized and
practices subsistence fanning.  Haciendas still exist in this part of the country and control
local power. The small population is dispersed over large areas which leads to migration
and poor social service coverage.  In Villa Serrano, the population has declined because of
out-migration primarily to the more prosperous Santa Cruz department.
10The Household Sample
Within each municipality, nine rural communities were selected randomly.  The capital of
the municipality was included to represent the urban areas.  In each of these sampling
units, 25 households were selected randomly for a total sample of 1,000 households. 5 The
following tables provide a brief description of the social and economic characteristics of
the sample households.
In order  to  evaluate whether the  characteristics of  the  respondent, specifically
gender and position in the household, would have an effect on responses, the field work
was  organized to  attempt to  interview roughly  50% men  and  50%  women.  Table 2
indicates that this objective was fairly well achieved:  for the study zone as a whole, 53%
of respondents were male and 47% were female.  Almost two-thirds of the respondents
were heads of households and one-third were spouses.
Table 2:  Selected Characteristics of Respondents (in %)
Charagua  Mizque  Tiahuanacu  Villa  All
Serrano  I
Gender of Respondent
Male  48.8  49.6  58.0  55.2  52.9
Female  51.2  50.4  42.0  44.8  47.1
Position in Household
Head  55.2  59.2  76.8  62.4  63.4
Spouse  44.8  40.8  23.2  37.6  36.6
Language
Castellano  58.0  2.0  5.6  95.6  40.3
Aymara  0.0  0.0  94.4  0.0  23.6
Quechua  0.0  98.0  0.0  4.4  25.6
Guarani  42.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  10.5
Religion
Catholic  74.4  94.4  77.6  94.4  85.2
Evangelical  Protestant  24.0  4.8  21.2  4.4  13.6
Other  1.6  0.8  1.2  1.2  1.2
Average  years lived in
community  30.1  33.4  44.2  32.5  35.0
Table 2  also indicates the linguistic diversity of Bolivia:  indigenous languages
dominate in Mizque (Quechua) and Tiahuanacu (Aymara), while Spanish is spoken the
most in  Villa Serrano and Charagua.  The majority of the population is  Catholic, but
important Protestant groups live in Charagua and Tiahuanacu.
5  For further  details  on the sampling  procedure  and the survey  field work,  see Sandoval  et al, 1998.
11Table 3 provides a broad breakdown of some of the key economic characteristics of
the households in the samnple. 6 Slightly more than one-fifth of the adult sample population
is inactive.  This  figure is higher in  Charagua.  Roughly  80% of economically active
household members are farmers. The vast majority of economically active people work as
self-employed or  unpaid  family  workers.  Only  in  Charagua  is  there  a  significant
percentage of wage earners.
One-fifth of the sample population received no education and more than one-half of
the population have no education past the primary level.  Among the four municipalities,
Charagua does notably better than the others in terms of educational achievement:  only
7% of the population have no education and almost one-third have been able to advance
past the primary level.  Graduates of vocational schools or universities are very rare in the
four municipalities.
Table 3:  Employment and Education Characteristics of the Sample (in %)
(for those older than 14 years of age)
Charagua  Mizque  Tiahuanacu  Villa  All
Serrano
Fanrmer  55.7  72.7  69.3  62.0  64.6
Trade  0.3  4.4  4.2  3.3  3.0
OtherPrivate  Sector  8.1  4.6  8.5  11.8  8.3
Public Sector  5.5  1.4  1.1  3.8  3.1
Inactive  30.5  17.0  17.0  19.2  21.2
All  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Employment  Status of
Economically  Active  People
Wage Earner  26.5  6.8  6.5  9.1  11.7
Self-employed  31.0  36.3  9.9  46.5  30.8
Unpaid Family Worker  42.4  56.9  83.5  44.4  57.5
All  100.0  10.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Education
None  7.1  22.9  28.8  24.9  20.6
Primary Incomplete  45.2  38.7  30.2  42.8  39.5
Primary Complete  15.6  18.8  12.6  12.6  14.9
Secondary Incomplete  22.1  16.5  18.2  8.9  16.4
Secondary Complete  5.7  2.0  6.9  2.6  4.3
Vocational  3.6  0.8  1.2  4.5  2.6
University  0.5  0.3  2.0  2.3  1.3
Other  0.1  0.0  0.0  1.4  0.4
All  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
The pattern of household expenditure shows only slight differences across the four
study zones (Table 4) although the levels of expenditures do differ a great deal.  Mizque is
6  It is to be noted that Table 3 is calculated  over all adult individuals in the sample, whilst Table 2 pertained
only to the respondents.
12the richest province with an average annual household expenditure per capita of Bs. 2,503
per year.  Charagua and Tiahuanacu have expenditure levels of respectively Bs. 1,857 and
Bs. 1,768 per year, while Villa Serrano has the lowest annual household expenditure per
capita at Bs. 1,502 per year, almost 40% below that of Mizque.  The Gini-coefficient over
the four study zones is 0.37, which is lower than 0.42 reported for the country as a whole
(World Bank,  1999).  Among the four municipalities, Tiahuanacu has the most  equal
distribution, while Charagua has the most uneven.  This is particularly noticeable when
comparing the ratio of the richest over the poorest village which is almost twice as high in
Charagua than in Tiahuanacu.  We have also calculated the relative incidence of poverty
based on a poverty line determined as two-thirds of the median household expenditure per
capita  for  the  four municipalities.  In  line with  the  observed  differences  in  average
expenditure per capita, Villa Serrano records the highest poverty incidence at 33%, while
the lowest incidence is in Mizque at 9%. The expenditure gap follows the same pattern.
Table 4: The Level and Composition of Household Expenditure
(mean of ratios)
Charagua  Mizque  Tiahuanacu  Villa  All
Serrano
Composition  of Household
Expenditure  (°/)
Purchased Food  50.6  44.9  34.5  39.0  42.2
Home Produced  Food  13.2  15.0  21.8  22.1  18.0
Education  3.0  1.8  4.0  1.9  2.7
Health  5.0  2.7  3.5  4.1  3.8
Housing  5.6  10.6  6.4  10.0  8.1
Private Transfers  2.2  3.0  3.7  3.6  3.1
Other  20.4  22.1  26.2  19.4  22.0
All  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Annual Household
Expenditure  per Capita
(Bolivianos)  1,857  2,503  1,768  1,502  1,907
Coefficient  of Variation  0.92  0.77  0.70  0.79  0.83
Gini-coefficient  0.39  0.36  0.33  0.35  0.37
Ratio of Richest over
Poorest  3.5  2.3  1.9  2.8  4.1
Poverty  Incidence
Poverty Head Count 2 24.8  9.1  21.0  32.9  22.2
Expenditure  Gap 3 20.7  21.1  24.1  30.0  24.8
At the time of the study $1 = Bs. 4.8.
2 Percentage  of population  which is poor. This is based on a relative  poverty line of two-thirds  of the
median of household  expenditure  per capita in the four municipalities.
3 The expenditure  gap equals  the shortfall,  relative  to the poverty  line, of expenditure  per capita of
the average  poor person, expressed  as a percentage  of the poverty line.
Household welfare is not measured only by the level of expenditures but also by
various other dimensions.  Table 5 contains several dimensions which can be calculated
from  the  LLI data  set.  Specifically, we  show  indicators  relating  to  how  often the
household goes hungry, the forced sale of assets in order to buy necessities, the number of
13children aged 5-14 who do not attend school, and access to tap water and electricity.  The
data are shown by quintiles which rank households based on household expenditure per
capita.  Table 5 suggests that 25% of sample households indicate that they often go hungry
in the course of the year.  However, the rate is much higher (38.5%) among the poorest
households.  About  1 in  5 households declared that in the past  year they had to  sell
livestock or equipment in order to buy necessities. This figures varies less pronouncedly by
quintile and is actually slightly higher for the richer households (presumably because they
have more assets to sell).  In the two poorest quintiles, more than 22% of households do
not send all of their children to school, while in the richest quintile this is only 5.5%.  In
addition, 11.7% of households had to pull children out of school in order to work at home
or to work on the farm. However, the incidence of this is three times as high in the poorest
as in the richest quintile.  In terms of access to amenities, electricity is significantly more
available to the rich than to the poor although access to tap water is fairly even across the
five quintiles.
Table 5:  Selected Indicators of Households Well-being
Quintile
Percent of Households  Poorest  2  3  4  Richest  All
Which  often go hungry  38.5  30.0  24.5  19.5  13.5  25.2
Which sold land, livestock
or  equipment in  order  to
buy necessities  19.5  18.5  26.0  25.5  24.0  22.7
Where not all children 5-14
attend school  22.3  22.5  16.9  18.2  5.5  18.4
Which pulled boys out of
school to help on farm or at
home  9.9  6.7  6.8  7.3  2.5  7.1
Which pulled girls  out of
school to help on farm or at
home  7.5  6.7  6.8  5.5  2.5  6.2
Which pulled children out
of school to help on farm or
at home  15.5  12.1  11.4  11.0  4.9  11.7
With access to electricity  12.5  18.0  23.5  40.0  57.5  30.3
With access to tap water  45.5  49.0  51.0  52.0  60.5  51.6
Table  6  shows  the  ownership  of  various  assets  by  households,  such  as  durable
goods,  land  and  animals.  The  durable  goods  most  frequently  owned  by  the  sample
households  are a radio  (present  in almost  two-thirds  of all households),  an audio  system,  a
bicycle,  and  a sewing  machine.  Overall,  asset ownership  is slightly  higher  in Tiahuanacu,
which  is probably  explained  by  its  proximity  to  La Paz,  which  improves  access  to  such
assets,  and  in Mizque  which  also  has  the  highest  per  capita  expenditures.  Overall  asset
ownership  is lowest in Villa  Serrano.  Ownership  of animals  is quite  high  in the study  area:
each household owns  on  average 20  large animals,  and  the variation  across the four
provinces  is  slight.  The average  household  also  owns  3.8 hectares  of land.  However,  in
14Charagua the average land ownership is somewhat higher at 5.0 hectares, while in Mizque
it is lowest at only 2.5 hectares.
From  a  social  capital perspective,  ease  of  communication  is  important.  The
municipalities differ in their overall access to communication and hence accessibility and
ease of networking. Once again Mizque and Tiahuanacu lead the other two provinces.
Close to 50% of households in Mizque have access to electricity, 40% in Tiahuanacu, 22%
in Charagua and 10% in Villa Serrano.
Table 6:  Ownership of Household Durables, Land and Animals




Car/Tmck  1.2  4.0  2.0  1.6  2.2
Boat  0.0  0.0  11.6  0.0  2.9
Outboard  Motor  0.4  0.8  0.4  0.0  0.4
Motorcycle/Moped  1.6  6.4  3.2  2.0  3.3
Bicycle  44.8  50.8  55.6  12.4  40.9
Color  TV  5.6  8.0  4.4  2.4  5.1
Black/White  TV  6.8  6.4  12.0  6.0  7.8
Audio  System  36.0  41.6  48.4  50.4  44.1
Telephone  3.2  2.0  3.2  0.8  2.3
Radio  64.4  58.8  82.4  54.4  65.0
Refrigerator/Freezer  9.2  10.4  3.2  5.2  7.0
Sewing  Machine  19.2  22.8  33.2  26.0  25.3
Washing  Machine/Dryer  0.4  0.8  0.8  0.4  0.6
Pressure  Lamp  1.6  24.0  3.6  9.2  9.6
Other Major Durable  4.0  4.8  3.6  17.2  7.4
Average  Asset  Score  2.0  2.4  2.7  1.9  2.2
Average  Number of Large-
Animals  Owned  22.8  16.1  21.2  17.8  19.5
Average Hectares  of Land
Owned  or Rented  5.0  2.5  3.9  3.7  3.8
Oxen,  cattle, horses,  mules, goats,  sheep and pigs.
In summary, the LLI sample shows four very diverse municipalities.  Mizque, in
Bolivia's Central Valleys, is characterized by intensive agriculture on small plots of land
and  is  the  richest  area.  Charagua in  the  eastern plains  of  the  country  is  the most
linguistically and religiously diverse municipality.  It has the highest education level and
the highest prevalence of wage employment, but is also characterized by the most unequal
distribution of household expenditure. Tiahuanacu is close to La Paz, and is characterized
by subsistence farming and a slightly below average household expenditure level.  Lastly,
Villa Serrano, in the valleys of southern Bolivia, is the poorest of the four study zones.
154.  TiHE  MAP  OF  LOCAL  INSTITUTIONS
The LLI questionnaire includes a large section to record the number of organizations and
households'  memberships  in  these  organizations.  Overall,  67  different  types  of
organizations were recorded in the four municipalities.  The total membership in these
organizations was  1,432.  Thus,  the  average households belonged  to  1.4 groups and
associations.  This density is much lower than in the two other countries in the LLI study:
in both Indonesia and Burkina Faso, the average household belongs to 6 groups (although
in  the  case  of  Burkina  Faso,  most  of  these  memberships  were  not  active).  The
disaggregation in categories of groups reported in Table 7 is parallel to the other countries
to allow a comparison.  However the rest of the report recombines groups to reduce the
number of categories and to reflect a functional distribution of groups and memberships.
The  landscape  of  local  institutions  is  dominated by  the  presence  of  agrarian
syndicates (sindicatos campesinos).  Although these were created by the state during the
land redistribution reforms of 1952, over time they have come to function as the central
community organization group.  Agrarian syndicates are largely perceived to be managing
community resources ranging  from land, forests, and  water to  resolving conflict. The
number of memberships in agrarian syndicates varies by municipality.
Table 7:  Active Memberships in Local Institutions, by Municipality
(original classification)
Tiahuanacu  Villa Serrano  Mizque  Charagua  All  % of
______  ______  ______  ~~~Total
____________________________  rTotal  %  Total  %  Total  %  Total  %
Community-Wide  Organizations  238  54.0  119  31.2  237  72.3  46  16.3  640  44.7
Sub-conrmunity Gender Groups  4  0.9  37  9.7  22  6.7  61  21.6  124  8.7
Sub-community Generation Groups  1  0.2  1  0.3  0  0.0  4  1.4  6  0.4
Religious Groups  17  3.9  15  3.9  2  0.6  21  7.4  55  3.8
Social Service Groups  0  0.0  0  0.0  0  0.0  0  0.0  0  0.0
Environmental  Service Groups  2  0.5  4  1.0  0  0.0  0  0.0  6  0.4
Productive Groups  20  4.5  12  3.1  7  2.1  66  23.4  105  7.3
Labor Groups  3  0.7  3  0.8  2  0.6  1  0.4  9  0.6
Natural Resource  Management
Groups  0  0.0  21  5.5  12  3.7  6  2.1  39  2.7
Credit/Finance  Groups  2  0.5  0  0.0  9  2.7  0  0.0  11  0.8
Marketing Groups  0  0.0  1  0.3  4  1.2  1  0.4  6  0.4
Supra-community  Level
Membership  Organizations  22  5.0  41  10.8  13  4.0  2  0.7  78  5.4
Recreational Groups  18  4.1  0  0.0  6  1.8  6  2.1  30  2.1
Other  114  25.9  127  33.3  14  4.3  68  24.1  323  22.6
,Total  441  100.0  381  100.0  328  100.0  282  100.0  1432  100.0
Memberships in groups managed by women are the next most prevalent categery,
totaling 9% of memberships.  These include:  mothers clubs, originally created to channel
food  distribution,  but  which  now  primarily  focus  on  sewing,  kitchen  gardens,  and
provision  of  school  breakfasts; women's  syndicates established to  represent women's
16demands since the creation of the agrarian syndicates; women's "food for work" groups;
and a small number of women's credit groups.
About 7% of all memberships are in a variety of production-oriented groups. These
include agricultural producers groups, livestock groups, artisan, trade and a range of other
commercially-oriented groups. Smaller numbers  of memberships  are in  environmental
groups (0.4%/o),  labor groups (0.6%), natural resource management  groups (2.7%), and
credit and finance groups (0.8%).
The total number of reported memberships in religious groups is surprisingly small,
3.8%.  However, this may be a function of the way people interpreted the question rather
than reflecting church attendance.
Linkage organizations or supra-community organizations accounted for 5% of all
memberships.  These  include  syndicate  organizations  at  the  cantonal,  provincial  and
departmental levels as well as other associations that represented particular types of groups
across communities. These included sports, religious, commercial, infrastructure, trade and
women's groups.
Table  8  reports the  distribution of  organizations and  memberships based  on a
reclassification  of  groups by  function.  While  agrarian  syndicates  still  dominate  the
landscape of membership  in local  level institutions, membership in  productive  groups
(12%),  health/education  groups  (7%)  and  social  service  groups  (9%)  emerge  more
strongly.  Memberships in supra-community organizations also increases to 7.5%. There is
also a clearer demarcation of NGOs (14%), most of which in effect also have an important
cross-community linkage function. NGOs include international NGOs such as CARE and
CARITAS and a range of strong local NGOs such as PLAFOR (Plan Forestal), CIAT
(Centro de Investigacion Agropecuaria del Tr6pico) and FONDECO (Fondo de Desarrollo
Comunal).
Table 8:  Number of Local Organizations and Number of Memberships
(functional classification)
Type  of Group  Number  of  Number  of Active  Percent  Examples
Organizations  Memberships
Agrarian  Syndicates  3  640  44.7  Captaincy,  syndicates
Productive  Groups  19  173  12.1  Agricultural  producers,
livestock,  construction,
water,  irrigation  comrnittees
Education/Health  School  boards,  health
Groups  8  103  7.2  cornmittees,  literacy  groups
Social  Service  Groups  14  132  9.2  Mothers  clubs,  youth  groups
Religious  Groups  6  55  3.8  Church  groups
Government  Groups  2  24  1.7  State  representatives
Supra-community  Cross-cormnunity  groups:
Groups  12  108  7.5  sports,  syndicates,  road
I_________  ____________groups_  __
NGO Groups  3  197  13.8  Bolivian  and international
Total  67  1432  100.0
17Table 9 reports the distribution of memberships across groups by municipality and
Table  10 reports  the distribution of households participating in  local  organizationls by
municipality. It is important to note that most households in Mizque and Tiahuanacu are
active members of agrarian syndicates but that this is true for only 50% of households in
Villa Serrano and less than 20% of households in Charagua. 7 As is explored in more detail
in the later section on measuring social capital, in municipalities where the syndicate is not
active or excludes the poor, other organizations that focus on improving livelihoods or
education and health emerge to play important roles in people's lives.  Thus, over 25% of
households in Charagua belong to social service clubs and to productive groups.  In Villa
Serrano, over 20% belong to education and health groups. Most of these groups are either
community initiated or initiated by NGOs.
Table  9:  Active  Memberships  in Local  Institutions,  by Municipality
Tiahuanacu  Villa  Mizque  Charagua  All  % of
Serrano  Total
Total  %  Total  %  Total  %  Total  %
Agrarian Syndicates  238  54.0  119  31.2  237  72.3  46  16.3  640  44.7
Productive  Groups  25  5.7  39  10.2  34  10.4  75  26.6  173  12.1
Education/Health
Groups  29  6.6  59  15.5  8  2.4  7  2.5  103  7.2
Social Service  Groups  9  2.0  36  9.4  22  6.7  65  23.0  132  9.2
Religious  Groups  17  3.9  15  3.9  2  0.6  21  7.4  55  3.8
Government  Groups  8  1.8  12  3.1  0  0.0  4  1.4  24  1.7
Supra-community
Groups  40  9.1  41  10.8  19  5.8  8  2.8  108  7.5
NGO Groups  75  17.0  60  15.7  6  1.8  56  19.9  197  13.8
|Total  441  100.0  381  100.0  328  100.0  282  100.0  1432  100.0
Table 10:  Percentage  of Households  Participating  in Local  Associations,
by Region
Tiahuanacu  Villa Serrano  Mizque  Charagua  All
Agrarian  Syndicates  92.8  47.6  91.2  18.0  62.4
Productive Groups  10.0  13.2  12.4  28.0  15.9
Education/Health Groups  11.2  21.2  3.2  2.8  9.6
Social Service Groups  3.6  14.4  8.4  25.2  12.9
Religious Groups  6.8  6.0  0.8  8.4  5.5
Government Groups  3.2  3.6  0.0  1.2  2.0
Supra-community Groups  15.2  14.0  7.6  3.2  10.0
NGO GroUps  24.4  18.4  2.0  21.2  16.5
7  In principle,  membership  in agrarian  syndicates  is mandatory. Household  responses  to the membership
question capture  the household's  assessment of  whether it  is an active participant in  the syndicate's
affairs.
18As is shown in Table 11 groups only for men are the most common (43%). The
number of women-only groups is 20%.  The rest, 37%, are mixed.  As mentioned before,
this reflects the dominance of the agrarian syndicates in which leadership revolves among
heads of households who are primarily male.  Since every household is already represented
by males, it is likely that these groups are viewed as male-only groups.  It is precisely for
this reason that in some areas women have created their own women-only syndicates to
address their needs.  The Law of Popular Participation which has given legal recognition to
territorial organizations such as the agrarian syndicates, which are dominated by men, has
unknowingly excluded women's  representation, both  in terms of interests as well as in
terms of leadership.  It is interesting to note that women-only groups are the highest, 26%,
in Charagua which has the largest number of NGOs.  Villa Serrano, which has the second
highest number of women-only groups, has an increasing number of NGOs.
In terms of age, although there are some youth groups and groups to take care of
the needs of the elderly, most groups attract men and women in their middle years.
Table 11: Distribution of Associational Memberships, by Gender and Age
Tiahuanacu  Villa Serrano  Mizque  Charagua  All
Gender
- Female only  17.2  21.3  16.2  25.9  19.8
- Male only  29.5  29.7  72.3  48.2  43.0
- Mixed  53.3  49.1  11.6  25.9  37.2
All  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Age
- Under 25 Years  6.3  1.8  4.0  3.9  4.1
- 25 + Years  64.4  82.9  84.8  82.3  77.5
- Mixed  29.3  15.2  11.3  13.8  18.4
All  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Since  households  belong to  only  1.4 associations  on  average,  and  given  the
dominance of  agrarian  syndicates, it  is  not  surprising  that  households consider most
associations to which they belong as very important (Table 12a).  The only association for
which this is less true is memberships in NGOs. When the distribution is examined only
for the groups that households considered the most important, the pattern of results almost
completely reflects the overall pattems of membership, i.e. agrarian syndicates emerge as
the most important, followed by productive groups (Table 12b). Overall, 12% of the very
important memberships are in NGOs and another 7% were in supra-community groups.
19Table 12a: Distribution (%) of Ratings of Importance of Associations
Very  Somewhat  Not  Total
Groups  Important  Important  Important  l
Agrarian  Syndicates  89.7  8.4  1.9  100.0
Productive  Groups  87.9  12.1  0.0  100.0
Education/Health  Groups  89.3  8.7  1.9  100.0
Social  Service  Groups  81.8  17.4  0.8  100.0
Religious  Groups  87.3  10.9  1.8  100.0
Government  Groups  83.3  16.7  0.0  100.0
Supra-community  Groups  83.3  13.9  2.8  100.0
INGO  Groups  77.7  20.8  1.5  100.0
Table 12b: Distribution (%)  of Memberships in Associations
Considered Very Important
Groups  Very  Important
Agrarian Syndicates  46.4
Productive  Groups  12.3
Education/Health  Groups  7.4
Social  Service  Groups  8.7
Religious  Groups  3.9
Government  Groups  1.6
Supra-conimunity  Groups  7.3
NGO  Groups  12.4
Total  100.00
The distribution of the most important groups was also examined across the four
municipalities.  Consistent  with  other  findings,  agrarian  syndicates  were  the  most
prominent in Mizque and Tiahuanacu and productive, health/education and social service
groups were the most important in Charagua and Villa Serrano.
To  further  understand  which  specific  associations  are  considered  the  most
important  in people's  lives, Table  13 reports  the ten  most  important  specific groups
reported by households.  As expected, the agrarian syndicates appear at the top of this list.
What is important to note is that despite the creation of these groups by the state almost 50
years ago, they have been in existence long enough to be considered by respondents as
having been initiated by communities. The second group in the list is NGOs, mentioned as
the most important group by  14% of households.  NGOs perform important functions
either in the absence of effective local government or in the absence of effective traditional
organizations, which is especially the case for Charagua and Villa Serrano.  This pattern of
substitution and complementarity will be discussed further in the next section. s NGOs are,
however, seen as being initiated by outsiders.
8  For an in-depth  discussion  see Narayan  (1999).
20The community is the source of most  associations in  all categories, except for
religious groups and NGO groups, which  are seen as having been initiated outside the
community (Table 14).  Government sponsored groups are of course categorized primarily
as  initiated  by  the  state.  In  addition  to  official  state  bodies,  this  category  includes
associations created by the Social Investment Fund and Rural Development Fund.  It is
also striking that all categories of local associations in Bolivia rely strongly on a formal
organizational structure  (Table  14).  Only  education/health groups and  social service
groups are infornally  organized to some degree.
Table  13:  The Ten Most  Important  Local Associations
Group Name  Category  Initiated by  Formal/  Times  Cited
Government,  Informal  (% of Total
Community  or  Group  Citations)
Outside
Community
1. Agrarian  Syndicate  Sindicatos  C  F  584 (41.3%)
Campesinos
2. Non-denominational  NGOs  NGO Groups  0  F  194  (13.7%)
3. Mothers  Club  Social  C/O  F/I  65 (4.6%)
Service
4. Agricultural  Producer's  Association  Productive  C/O  F  60 (4.2%)
(Work Groups)  Groups
5. Denominational  NGOs  NGO Groups  0  F  48 (3.4%)
6. Women's  Center  Social  C/O  F/I  46 (3.3%)
l_____________________________________  Service
7. Captaincy  Sindicatos  C  F  43 (3.0%)
Carnpesinos
8. Central/Sub-central  Sindicatos  C  F  39 (2.8%)
Association/Federation  of Rural People  Campesinos
9. Heads  of Family  Association  Education/  C  F  39 (2.8%)
I_____________________________________  Health
10.  Informal  Education  Group  Education/  0  F/I  23 (1.6%)
Health  . ._._._.._.
Table  14:  Type  of Initiation  and Organization  of Groups
Initiation  Organization
State  Community  Outside  Formal  Informal
l  ___________  ____________  __________  Com  m  unity
Agrarian Syndicates  10.9  84.5  4.5  96.4  3.6
Productive Groups  6.9  65.9  27.2  92.5  7.5
Education/Health Groups  6.8  63.1  30.1  82.5  17.5
Social  Service  Groups  6.1  60.6  33.3  75.0  25.0
Religious Groups  3.6  32.7  63.6  94.6  5.5
Government  Groups  70.8  16.7  12.5  91.7  8.3
Supra-community  Groups  7.4  83.3  9.3  90.7  9.3
NGO  Groups  3.6  8.1  88.3  87.8  12.2
21Households  in  the  sample have  a  surprisingly  high  community  or  collective
orientation. Close to 50% of households said that the main reason for joining groups is the
expected impact on the whole community (Table 15). This is probably a reflection of two
factors.  Many rural communities are composed primarily of indigenous people who still
live in solidarity with  each other.  Second, this finding reflects the primary role of the
agrarian syndicates.  It is interesting to contrast this figure with Indonesia, which at the
community  level  used  to  have  strong  traditions  of  gotong  royong,  or  collective
participation  and  self-help.  Yet,  in  Indonesia,  only  19%  of  households  listed  the
community as a prime reason for joining groups.  In Bolivia, the other main reason for
joining groups was the expected benefits to household livelihood. Only 13% said that they
belonged to groups because membership was mandatory.  This result, together with the
fact that most groups are seen as community-initiated, attests to the fact that most groups
appear to be serving a purpose in the lives of households and communities, and therefore
people choose to participate in these groups.
Table 15: Reasons for Joining the Most Important Groups
Tiahuanacu  Villa  Mizque  Charagua  All
Reasons  for Joining  (%)  Serrano
Impact  on Household
Livelihood  15.3  26.4  26.4  33.5  24.6
Impact  on Community  65.8  39.2  28.6  45.5  45.6
Everybody  Belongs  3.4  9.1  8.1  1.9  5.7
Mandatory  6.0  12.2  28.9  3.0  12.6
Emergency/Future  Benefit  3.1  9.1  4.4  6.8  5.7
Enjoyable  5.7  2.3  3.1  6.4  4.3
Other  0.8  1.7  0.6  3.0  1.4
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Households were specifically asked if membership in groups improved their access
to particular services.  Table  16 reflects the fact that activities of the associations affect
both communities as well as households. The most commonly reported benefits were in
education (60%), water and sanitation (42%), health (38%), land rights, (30%), electricity
(24%), agricultural technology (20%) and irrigation (20%). The fact that these numbers are
much higher than what the functional classification suggested (see Table 9) may reflect the
fact that most groups serve multiple functions or have spillover effects in areas other than
their designated primary function.  It may also be a consequence of the way in which the
question was asked.  Most questions in the LLI questionnaire were asked in an open-ended
manner  and the interviewer coded the responses.  However, for this  question, all the
service categories were read out and respondents were asked specifically if  groups had
been used to access the entire list of services reported in Table 16.
22Table  16:  Involvement  in Service Provision  of the Most  Important  Groups
Percent  of Groups  Active  in  Tiahuanacu  Villa  Mizque  Charagua  All
Serrano
Education  63.2  75.3  46.3  50.8  59.8
Health  33.7  44.0  36.0  39.5  38.2
Water Supply and Sanitation  28.0  48.3  53.4  39.8  41.9
Electricity  43.3  7.1  22.8  15.8  24.3
Credit  3.9  3.4  9.6  24.4  9.3
Savings  4.9  1.7  7.5  5.6  4.8
Agricultural Inputs/Technology  13.5  22.2  22.7  26.3  20.6
Irrigation  7.0  13.1  55.9  7.1  20.5
Land, Forestry, Water Rights  33.1  13.6  41.9  32.0  30.1
Membership in groups provides a rich environment for social learning (Table 17).
In  addition,  it  can  provide  experiences in  leadership.  In  most  societies  leadership
possibilities are limited to the local elite.  In Bolivia, by contrast, 50.9% of households in
the poorest quintile report being able to take up leadership positions in groups. This figure
differs little from the median and upper income groups (57% and 51% respectively). There
are, however, strong differences between municipalities and these parallel to some extent
the differences in income inequality.  In Tiahuanacu, 80% of households in the poorest
villages and 76% of households in the richest villages have been in leadership positions.
In Villa Serrano, by contrast, households in the richest villages are more frequently in
leadership positions (49%) than households in the poorest villages (40%).  One should
keep in mnind  the widespread poverty in rural Bolivia and the strong communal orientation
in many indigenous communities. It is interesting to compare these figures with Indonesia,
where only 18% of the poorest households have been in leadership positions, as compared
to 29% of the richest households.
23Table  17:  Leadership  Positions  in Local Associations,  by Income  Level
% of Households with
Leadership Positions in the
Most Important Associations
Household Quintiles  5













Poorest villages  80.7
Richest  villages  76.0
Villa Serrano:
Poorest villages  39.8
Richest villages  48.5
Mizque:
Poorest villages  44.3
Richest villages  45.3
Charagua:
Poorest villages  41.8
Richest villages  41.4
245.  COMPLEMENTARITY  AND  SUBSTITUTION  BETWEEN  ORGANIZATIONS
In order to understand the impact of associations, it is important to dig a little deeper into
the dynamic  interaction between institutions and to  understand the  evolution of these
associations.  For  this  purpose,  we  consider  four  types  of  organizations:  agrarian
syndicates, other local organizations, municipal government and  linkage organizations,
including some NGOs.
In Tiahuanacu, Mizque and Villa  Serrano rural communities are represented by
agrarian syndicates (sindicatos campesinos).  These organizations date back to 1952 when
they were created by the state as a mechanism for political control.  As mentioned in the
previous section, they have since evolved into an organization of local self-government
which legitimizes the status of farmers as participants in the political and planning process.
The Law of Popular Participation of 1994 gave the syndicates formal status as channels of
communication with the municipal government.  The eastern plains of Bolivia, however,
have remained largely untouched by this process of agrarian reform and establishment of
syndicates.  Specifically  in  Charagua,  rural  comnmunities are  organized  around  the
Regional Assembly of the Guarani people, which performs functions similar to those of the
agrarian syndicates.  However, the traditional  captaincy position was in  a semi-feudal
relationship to  hacienda  owners which  served to  reinforce the  subservient position of
farmers, who were a source of cheap and reliable labor to the Hacienda owners.
Participation in agrarian syndicates is based on a rotation system which is found
throughout the Andean region (Pearse, 1984; Booth et al, 1996). Heads of households who
own land-parcels in the community must assume directive posts in the syndicate at least
once (at the risk of receiving fines and penalties if they do not take their turn).  The system
requires an annual rotation in directors so that there is a broad participation of households
in the management of the syndicate.  This system makes a significant claim on available
human resources, especially in Mizque and Tiahuanacu where the agrarian syndicates are
well established.  In Villa Serrano the rotation system is not applied and in Charagua the
traditional Guarani pattern of hereditary captaincies is followed, hence leadership skills are
not widely shared.
In addition to the agrarian syndicates, functional organizations (primarily of women
and of producers)  are active in each of the four municipalities.  Their membership is
voluntary and they are primarily oriented to imparting benefits on the family rather than on
the community. The institutional history and strength of different types of organizations is
different  in  the  four  selected municipalities.  Tiahuanacu and  Mizque have  a  strong
organizational  tradition  which  has  preserved  many  of  the  indigenous  patterns  of
organization.  In  contrast,  Villa  Serrano and  Charagua have  a  weaker  organizational
tradition which was usurped in the service of the dominant group of landowners and timber
and ranching interests.  Both in Villa Serrano and in Charagua, because of the relative
absence of agrarian syndicates and because of exclusionary practices, the poor belong to
other organizations which have emerged, mainly thanks to the activities of NGOs.
25Mizque and  Charagua are characterized by effective municipal government.  In
Mizque, municipal government is headed by an established campesino elite that has trained
workers and incorporated technical procedures.  In Charagua, municipal government is
made up of  ranchers and  timber barons, but  it  is open  to  dialogue with  the  Guarani
indigenous population.  In  Villa  Serrano  and  Tiahuanacu, municipal  government  is
relatively weak.  In Tiahuanacu the elite has direct access to La Paz and bypasses the local
structures (Sandoval et al, 1998).
Why  is  it that  in  Charagua municipal government is  responsive  and  effective
despite being dominated by particular economic interests that had previously suppressed
local  populations?  To  understand  this  we  need  to  examine  the  role  of  linkage
organizations including NGOs and the role of the Law of Popular Participation. Regional
grassroots organizations and NGOs serve to link organizations together so as to increase
negotiating power vis-a-vis the state and markets or to increase access to new information
and resources.  Regional grassroots leadership plays an important role in the interaction
between the communities and  the municipal government.  It  consists primarily cf  the
directors  of  the  supra-comrnmunal  syndicate organization  ("campesino  central")  wvhich
coordinates the activities of the communal syndicates.  In Charagua, regional leadership
consists of the directors of the Zonal Assemblies of the Guarani People which coordinates
the actions  of  the  Local  Assemblies.  This  regional  leadership constitutes  an  "inter-
community political arm" which is recognized both by the communities and the municipal
government. They held the third leading position in the CUSTB in 1993 and won a seat in
parliament in an alliance with Cardenas's MRTKL (Alb6, 1995). This new leadership and
accompanying political clout has broken the hold hacienda owners had on the traditional
captaincy of the Guarani people. It is this new regional Guarani Assembly, which is a
blend of old  and new in  terrns of organizational design, that has  led to  a new  era of
negotiation with the local elite. The relations between the dominant elite and the Guarani
are now cordial rather than conflictual.
Among the other three municipalities, this regional leadership is the most effective
and dynamic in Mizque.  In Tiahuanacu, regional leadership is still emerging while in Villa
Serrano the weakness of regional leadership reflects the low overall presence of agrarian
syndicates in that municipality (Sandoval et al, 1998).
Furthernore, in each of the four municipalities there are NGOs actively working in
the  areas of  health,  education  and  agricultural and  livestock  production.  They play
important direct roles in service provision and in reorienting regional leaders away from
national political issues to regional development issues.
The Law of Popular Participation is beginning to have an impact by breaking up
the hold of the former political elite on municipal decision making. Before the Law of
Popular Participation,  Civic  Committees, consisting of  the local  elite,  pressured both
prefectures and the central government into channeling resources in favor of the dominant
groups in each region.  In Mizque, Charagua and Villa Serrano, the civic committee has
almost ceased to function.  In Tiahuanacu, there is still a Residents Committee that consists
of townspeople who have emigrated to La Paz but who come each year to party and "show
off'  their social and economic progress.
26In summary, it is possible to classify the four municipalities along two axes  - the
strength of traditional institutions and the strength of regional grassroots leadership and
municipal  government  - as in Figure  1.
Figure 1. The Four Municipalities, by Strength of Institutions
Strong institutional tradition
Tiahuanacu  Mizque
Weak regional leadership  Strong regional leadership
Ineffective municipal government  Effective municipal government
Villa Serrano  Charagua
Weak institutional tradition
276.  THE MEASUREMENT  OF SOCIAL  CAPITAL
Social capital is the norms, networks and social relations embedded in formal and informal
institutions of society that enable people to coordinate action and achieve desired goals.
All societies are rich in social capital.  Most people belong to primary social groups --  the
family, kin groups, ethnic groups - as well as informal and formal associations. Bonding,
solidarity or social cohesion provides the basis for reciprocity and exchanges within these
groups. However when the power and resources of these social groups is limited, bridging
or linking social capital with other groups becomes important to access different resources,
information and power (Putnam, 1995; Portes and Landolt, 1996; Evans, 1996; Woolcock,
1997;  Narayan,  1997).  In  the  Bolivian  context,  solidarity  within  indigenous  groups
provides the foundation for identity and survival. Linkages between indigenous groups
consolidate their resources and power and change their ability to be heard and to negotiate
with  the  formal  governance  structures.  The  social  relations  and  preferences  within
government  structures are also  important and  influence their  openness to  inclusion of
indigenous groups as well as their responsiveness to local needs and demands.
In this study, we construct a quantitative social capital measure which focuses on
social capital in groups and associations and supra-community associations.  Our index
does  not  distinguish the  latter  explicitly because  the  number of  supra-community or
linkage organizations is numerically small in  the data set.  However their  importance
comes through in the in-depth qualitative data.
The effectiveness with which social capital in the form of local associations can
fulfill  its  role  in  disseminating  information,  reducing  opportunistic  behavior,  and
facilitating  collective  decision  making  depends  on  many  aspects  of  the  association
reflecting its structure, its membership, and its functioning.  For this study, we focus on six
aspects of local associations.
(1)  Density of Membership
This  is  measured  by  the  number  of  memberships  of  each  household  in  existing
associations.  The provision of a map of local associations was one of the prime objectives
of the LLI study and a complete inventory of all existing associations was made at the
village level.  Each household was then given that inventory and asked which associations
they  were  a  member  of.  The  survey recorded  67  different  organizations  in  the  40
communities in the study, for a total of 1,432 active memberships.  This indicates that on
average each household is a member of one or two associations.  The most important of
these is the agrarian syndicate, which as the previous section indicated, takes account of
45% of all memberships.  It is therefore essential in the case of Bolivia that density of
associations be measured separately for agrarian syndicates and other local institutions.
Table 18 indicates that in Tiahuanacu and Mizque, close to 90% of households are
active members of  the  agrarian syndicate.  In Villa  Serrano this  is  only  57%  and in
Charagua it is only 18%. (As we indicated previously, agrarian syndicates are not active in
28Charagua and their functions are implemented by the Regional Assembly of the Guarani
people.  Given the similarities of functions, membership in this organization is tabulated
under the heading of agrarian syndicate.)  It is striking that active membership in agrarian
syndicates declines steadily with a rising level of education.  At an aggregate level, the
correlation with income level is quite low, but this masks regional differences.  Indeed, in
the two municipalities with high active membership, membership is below average only in
the richest quintile (Mizque) or the richest two quintiles (Tiahuanacu) (Table 19).  In the
two other municipalities, membership is below average in the poorest quintile, peaks in the
second poorest quintile, and then declines steadily with rising income level.  This suggests
that in Charagua and Villa Serrano, the poorest households are to  a  significant degree
excluded from active membership in the agrarian syndicates.
However, Villa Serrano and Charagua have the highest membership in other local
organizations and this membership is strongest among the poorer households.  This reflects
the complementarity between different types of organizations. In Tiahuanacu and Mizque,
the agrarian syndicates are very effective and are active in the provision of a wide range of
services.  It  stands to  reason  that where  this  is not  the  case people  create voluntary
organizations to fill the void.
(2)  Heterogeneity Index
As explained earlier, the LLI questionnaire identified the three most important associations
for each household.  For those associations a number of supplementary questions were
asked including about the internal homogeneity of the group.  This was rated according to
nine criteria:  neighborhood, kin group, occupation, economic status, religion, gender, age,
level of education, and political affiliation. 9 On that basis we constructed a score ranging
from 0 to 9 for each of the three groups (a value of  1 on each criterion indicates that
members of the association were "mostly from different" kin group, economic status, etc.).
The score of the three groups was averaged and the resulting index was re-scaled from 0 to
100, whereby 100 corresponds to the highest possible value of the index.1°  The average
score of the heterogeneity index for the four study zones was 64. 1, which is fairly high." 1
9  Unfortunately,  language  and ethnic group  were not included  in the criteria  - a regrettable  result of the
cross-country  comparative  nature  of the LLI Study.
t° If a household  reported fewer than three important  groups, the averaging  procedure was done over
whichever  number  of groups  was actually  reported.
"  For comparison,  in Indonesia  the equivalent  score was 53.5 and  for Burkina  Faso  it was 77.0.
29Table 18: Social Capital Dimensions, by Region and Household Characteristics
Memberships  Memberships  Index of  Meeting  Index of  Index of  Community
in Sindicatos  in Other  Local  Heterogeneity  Attendance  Participation  Contributions  Orientation
Campesinos  Associations  In Decision
(%)  (number)  Making
Municipality
Charagua  17.6  1.0  56.8  6.6  85.7  5.8  56.4
Mizque  90.4  0.3  52.3  5.4  88.3  4.8  76.7
Tiahuanacu  88.0  0.8  73.8  3.7  86.7  4.7  73.3
Villa Serrano  57.2  0.9  72.7  5.4  77.7  1.7  64.5
Head of Household
Male  63.3  0.8  64.0  5.3  85.2  4.4  67.6
Female  63.1  0.6  64.1  4.7  82.8  3.3  74.7
Religion
Catholic  64.0  0.7  63.2  5.0  84.2  4.2  70.3
Evangelical Protestant  58.8  0.9  68.7  6.2  89.2  5.2  57.1
Education of Head
None  71.7  0.5  66.9  4.4  84.2  2.9  73.5
Primary-Incomplete  62.5  0.8  63.6  5.7  85.5  4.3  68.6
Primary-Completed  62.8  0.9  61.3  5.1  84.3  5.3  67.0
Secondary-  Incomplete  60.0  0.9  59.7  5.5  83.9  5.1  66.8
Secondary-Completed  53.1  0.9  70.3  4.7  86.7  3.8  61.1
Vocational  40.0  1.5  74.5  3.8  86.0  6.2  52.2
University/Other  22.2  1.6  72.0  2.9  81.3  3.2  58.3
Quintile
Poorest  58.0  0.8  67.8  4.4  85.3  3.5  63.1
2  62.5  0.9  62.7  5.5  86.0  3.0  61.0
3  67.5  0.7  64.8  5.3  87.7  4.2  74.6
4  66.5  0.7  62.4  5.5  85.5  5.1  71.2
Richest  62.0  0.7  62.7  5.2  80.1  5.5  72.8
All  63.3  0.8  64.1  5.2  84.9  4.3  68.5
Variable definitions are (for details, see text):
*  Memberships in sindicatos campesinos: percent of households who are members of sindicatos campesinos.
*  Memberships in other local associations: average number of memberships per household.
*  Index of heterogeneity: scale (0- 100) of internal heterogeneity of three most important groups, according to nine criteria.
*  Meeting attendance: average number of times a household member attended a group meeting in the last three months.
*  Index ofparticipation in decision making: scale (0-100) of extent of active participation in decision making in three most important groups.
*  Indexofcontribution:  score (0-100) of average and in-kind fees paid fornmemberships  in three most important groups.
*  Community orientation: percent of memberships in organizations which are community-initiated.
Note:  Except for column 1, averages exclude households with no active memberships. Figures for agrarian syndicates differ slightly from those in Table 10 because the supra-
community structure of the syndicates was included in "membership in sindicatos campesinos" for the regression analysis while it was in the separate category "supra-community
group" in Table 10.
A  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,  .Table 19: Social Capital Dimensions, by Region and Quintiles
Quintile  Total
Municipality  Poorest  2  3  4  I  Richest
Member hips  in Sindi atos  Campesinos  :  _  _
Charagua  17.3  24.6  15.7  14.3  12.8  17.6
Mizque  95.5  90.3  94.1  90.6  86.6  90.4
Tiahuanacu  92.2  92.2  96.3  80.8  76.2  88.0
Villa Serrano  52.0  64.2  61.4  57.1  51.7  57.2
Total  58.0  62.5  67.5  66.5  62.0  63.3
Memberships  in Other Local  Associations
Charagua  0.8  1.0  0.7  1.3  1.1  1.0
Mizque  0.5  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3
Tiahuanacu  0.7  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.9  0.8
Villa Serrano  0.9  1.1  1.1  0.8  0.8  0.9
Total  0.8  0.9  0.7  1  0.7  0.7  0.8
Index o Heterogeneity
Charagua  56.6  53.2  57.2  57.3  61.5  56.8
Mizque  55.6  54.4  53.7  48.6  52.7  52.3
Tiahuanacu  71.1  68.7  76.2  74.9  78.4  73.8
Villa  Serrano  76.9  72.5  69.7  71.2  69.4  72.7
Total  67.8  62.7  64.8  62.4  62.7  64.1
Meeting  Attendance
Charagua  5.4  6.5  8.4  7.3  6.2  6.6
Mizque  4.3  5.9  5.0  5.6  5.7  5.4
Tiahuanacu  3.6  4.2  3.9  3.4  3.3  3.7
Villa Serrano  4.4  5.6  5.3  6.8  5.5  5.4
Total  4.4  5.5  5.3  5.5  5.2  5.2
Index of  Participation  in Decision  making
Charagua  91.5  92.1  91.1  81.5  69.3  85.7
Mizque  94.7  87.5  93.2  88.5  83.5  88.3
Tiahuanacu  88.5  86.3  86.0  89.3  82.9  86.7
Villa Serrano  75.1  77.4  79.5  78.4  81.3  77.7
Total  85.3  86.0  87.7  85.5  80.1  84.9
Index of Contribution  I
Charagua  6.5  3.9  5.8  6.4  7.5  5.8
Mizque  2.8  2.5  5.2  6.3  4.7  4.8
Tiahuanacu  4.0  4.1  3.6  5.4  7.0  4.7
Villa Serrano  1.4  1.0  2.4  1.8  2.6  1.7
Total  . 3.5  3.0  4.2  5.1  5.5  4.3
Community  Orientation
Charagua  41.0  52.5  70.6  58.9  64.7  T 56.4
Mizque  75.0  78.9  81.6  73.0  76.1  76.7
Tiahuanacu  79.2  67.2  72.7  73.9  73.6  73.3
Villa Serrano  59.7  52.5  71.1  73.8  74.0  64.5
Total  63.1  61.0  74.6  71.2  72.8  68.5
31The  index  shows  a  distinct  regional  and  socioeconomic  pattern  (Table 18).
Associations in Tiahuanacu and Villa Serrano are much more heterogeneous than in the
other two municipalities.  The index follows a U-shaped pattern in relation to education:
heterogeneity is highest for people with low or no education and for those with the highest
amount of education.  The index is not systematically related to income level, although
households in the poorest quintile appear to be members of slightly more heterogeneous
associations (Table 19).  It  is  also worth noting that the  internal heterogeneity  of the
agrarian syndicates and that of other associations do not systematically differ from each
other (Table 20).
(3)  Meeting Attendance
Meetings are often considered an indicator of participation. We therefore constructed a
meeting attendance index which measured the average number of times someone from the
household attended group meetings, normnalized  for the number of memberships of each
household.
For each membership  in  an  association, the  average sample  household attends
5.2  meetings in a three-month period.  This figure is slightly higher in Charagua and lower
in Tiahuanacu.  Male heads of households attend meetings more frequently than female
heads of households.  Meeting attendance shows an inverse U-pattern with respect to
education and level of income:  the highest meeting attendance is recorded for people in
the middle quintiles and with average levels of education. Meetings of agrarian syndicates
are generally attended slightly less frequently than those of other organizations, except in
Tiahuanacu (Table 20).
(4)  Active Participation Index
It has been argued that associations which follow a democratic pattern of decision making
are more  effective than  others.  The LLI questionnaire asked association  members to
evaluate subjectively whether they were "very active", "somewhat active", or "not very
active" in the group's decision making. This response was scaled from 2 to 0 respectively,
and averaged across the three most important groups.  The resulting index was re-scaled
from 0 to 100.  The average value for this index is 84.9, indicating a very high degree of
active participation in decision making.
The  index  is  systematically  higher  for  agrarian  syndicates  than  for  other
organizations.  This explains why the index is the highest for Tiahuanacu  and Mizque,
the  two  municipalities  where  agrarian  syndicates  are  most  active.  Male  heads  of
households participate somewhat more actively than female heads of households.  The
correlation with education and income is weak except that the richest quintile shows a
lower participation rate than others.  However, as Table  19 indicates, there are strong
regional differences in this correlation.  In Charagua, active participation in the Guarani
councils  is at a  very  high  level  (over  90%)  for the lowest  three  quintiles  and  then
declines  sharply  with  income  thereafter.  In  Villa  Serrano,  the  reverse  pattern  is
observed  and  active  participation  is  the  highest  in  the  two  richest  quintiles.  In
Tiahuanacu and Mizque, the correlation with income is weaker.
32Table 20:  Social Capital Dimensions, by Region and Type of Institution
Sindicatos  Other  Local
Campesinos  Associations
Municipality  Index of Heterogeneity
Charagua  59.2  55.8
Mizque  51.6  56.1
Tiahuanacu  72.4  77.3
Villa Serrano  71.9  71.9
Total  63.8  65.7
Meeting Attendance
Charagua  5.3  6.7
Mizque  5.4  5.4
Tiahuanacu  4.0  3.8
Villa Serrano  5.2  5.8
Total  4.9  5.5
Index of Participation in
.___________  Decision making
Charagua  89.8  85.1
Mizque  90.0  83.7
Tiahuanacu  89.0  83.6
Villa Serrano  85.8  72.2
Total  88.7  80.9
Index of Contribution
Charagua  4.1  6.0
Mizque  5.4  3.7
Tiahuanacu  5.1  4.0
Villa Serrano  1.2  1.9
Total  4.2  4.1
Community Orientation
Charagua  79.5  52.2
Mizque  79.0  59.1
Tiahuanacu  86.1  45.1
Villa Serrano  93.7  37.9
Total  84.8  47.2
(5)  Membership Dues
All other things being equal, it is presumably a sign of greater interest in the association if
one is willing to pay membership dues.  Only 20% of associations in Bolivia charge such
fees,  which  on  average  amount to  Bs. 6.6  per  year.  However, almost  two-thirds of
memberships in  associations require a labor contribution which  on average amounts to
19 days per year.  We constructed an index which averaged contributions in cash and in
kind and whereby the highest contributed amount or number of days was set equal to 100.
The low value of the resulting index (4.3) reflects the high number of associations where
no membership fees at all are charged.  The index is highest in Charagua and lowest in
Villa Serrano.  The contributions required by agrarian syndicates on average do not differ
from those required by other organizations (Table 20).
33(6)  Community Orientation
Many case studies on the functioning of local  associations have argued that voluntary
organizations that find their roots in the community are more effective than externally
imposed and/or mandated groups (Uphoff, 1992; Narayan, 1995; Ostrom, 1995).  Eighty-
five percent of respondents regarded the agrarian syndicates as being community initiated.
As discussed earlier, this is a remarkable result given that historically the syndicates were
established by the government as a vehicle for political control.  It underscores the degree
to which the nature of the organization and the local involvement have changed over time.
Only 47% of other local organizations are community-initiated (Table 20).  In Mizque and
Charagua, however, there was a stronger degree of community involvement in setting up
non-syndicate organizations.
347.  HOUSEHOLD  WELFARE  AND  SOCIAL CAPITAL
In this section we address the question whether households with a higher level of social
capital are better off.  In other words, can we establish empirically a positive correlation
between an index of social capital or the dimensions of  social capital discussed in the
previous section and various outcome indicators which measure household welfare?  Jn
principle it is not difficult to adjust a conventional model of household economic behavior
to reflect the role of social capital.  Such a model consists of three sets of equations.
*  The  first  set  of  equations explains the  income  generating behavior  of  the
household  and  describes  how  the  household  combines  its  various  asset
endowments to make decisions regarding labor supply for each of its members,
taking the wage rates and demand situation in the labor market as given. In this
formulation, social capital can be considered as one among several classes of
assets  available  to  the  household to  make  its  decisions.  Social capital  is
combined with human capital, physical capital and the ownership of land to
make productive decisions.
*  The  second  set  of  equations  portrays  the  household's  demand  for  inputs
(agricultural inputs, credit) and services (education, health) which may need to
be combined with labor supply in order to generate income.  Here too, social
capital is one category of capital which determines these decisions.
*  A third set of  equations explains the households'  consumption and  savings
behavior as a function of the level and composition of income.
The customary reduced-form model of these structural equations relates household
expenditure directly to the exogenous asset endowment of the household and yields the
following estimating equation: 12
fnEi  = a + 8SCi + rHCi + 6°Ci  +  Xi + qZi + ui  (1)
Where  Ei  =  household expenditure per capita of household i
SC,  =  household endowment of social capital
HCi  =  household endowment of human capital
oCi  =  household endowment of other assets
Xi  =  a vector of household  characteristics
Zi  =  a vector of village/region  characteristics
ui  =  error term
12  This reduced-form  model  was also  the basis for the empirical  study  by Narayan  and Pritchett  (1997)  on
social capital in Tanzania.
35The key feature of this model is the assumption that social capital is truly "capital"
and hence has a measurable return to the household.  Social capital has many "capital"
features:  it requires resources  (3especially  time)  to  be  produced, and  it is  subject to
accumulation and decumulation.'  Social capital can be  acquired in  formal or informal
settings, just  like human capital (e.g., schools versus learning-by-doing).  Much social
capital is built during interactions which occur for social, religious, or cultural reasons.
Other  interactions occur in  settings specifically aimed to  yield economic benefits.  In
Bolivia, this is the case with the agrarian syndicates and other production-oriented groups.
The key assumption is that the networks built through these interactions have measurable
benefits to the participating individuals, and lead, directly or indirectly, to a higher level of
well-being.  This is the proposition which we test empirically in this paper by means of
equation (1).  Structurally, the returns to social capital could be measured in the earnings
functions if, e.g., one's network helps in getting better-paying jobs or promotions.  It could
also show up in the various functions that detennine access to credit, agricultural inputs or
other factors which enhance the productivity of a household enterprise.
The  dependent  variable  of  equation (1)  is  the natural  logarithm of  household
expenditure per capita.14 The explanatory variables consist of the asset endowments of the
households, demographic control variables, and locational dummy variables.  Household
assets are assumed to consist of human capital, social capital, land, and physical assets.
We have  already discussed in  the previous  section the variables  used to  measure the
household's  endowment of social capital.  Human capital is measured conventionally by
the years of education of the adult members of the household.'5 Three productive assets
relevant in rural settings were included: the number of hectares of land owned, the number
of large animals and the number of pieces of major farm equipment.
In addition to the asset variables, the regressions include demographic variables,
such as household size and gender of the head of household. Age of the head of household
and its squared term were included to capture the life cycle of household welfare.  Lastly, a
set of dummy variables were included to indicate the municipality (Tiahuanacu was used
as the omitted category) and whether households lived in the municipality's  capital city.
These variables capture the general economic and social conditions of the municipalities
along dimensions other than those which we were able to include in the model.
The social capital dimensions which we discussed in the previous section can be
included in the model as separate variables or they can be  aggregated into an index.  A
study by Narayan and Pritchett (1997) which estimated the effect of social capital on the
welfare of households in Tanzania used a multiplicative index capturing the number of
Events in transition economies such as Russia and former Yugoslavia are powerful evidence of the effects
of the decumulation of social capital (Rose, 1995).
4  This variable was constructed in nominal form and does not capture any regional price variation that may
exist in Bolivia.  As of writing we do not have access to a regional price index to deflate household
expenditure per capita.  We assume that the regional dummy variable included in the regression will
capture price differences.
5  The LLI questionnaire recorded only the level of educational achievement of each adult in the household
and the number of years of education was imputed from that information.
36memberships  in  associations,  their  internal  heterogeneity,  and  aspects  of  internal
functioning.  The use of a multiplicative procedure regards the different dimensions as
interacting with one another, e.g., heterogeneity or internal functioning may have different
effects depending upon the number of organizations of which the household is a member.
However, it is also possible to consider an additive index whereby the assumption is made
that each social capital dimension acts independently (although not necessarily with equal
weight).  The conceptual literature on  social capital is not  advanced to  the stage that
theoretical arguments can be put forth to select one model or the other. We show therefore
in Table 21 the results of different aggregations as well as the model which includes the
dimensions separately.  In line with the index used by Narayan and Pritchett (1997), we
constructed  a  multiplicative  index  of  the  number  of  memberships,  the  index  of
heterogeneity  and  the  index  of  active  participation  in  decision  making.  We  also
constructed an additive index as the arithmetic average of all six social capital dimensions.
As  an  alternative, we  constructed an  additive index of  four  of  the  six social  capital
dimensions, excluding the heterogeneity index and the index of active participation (for
reasons discussed below).
Column 1 of Table 21 indicates that the basic reduced-form model of household
welfare, excluding any social capital variables, explains 41% of the variance in household
welfare.  Most of the included assets and control variables are significant.  The results
indicate that an  additional year of education on average yields a 4.7% higher level of
household welfare.  The results indicate fairly low returns to the ownership of land and
animals, but very high  returns to the ownership of farm equipment (such equipment is
owned by relatively few households).  There is  a distinct life-cycle pattern to welfare,
peaking at age 58.  Women-headed households, all other things being the samne,  have a
10%  lower  welfare  level  than  male-headed  households.  The  large  and  significant
coefficients  of  the  locational  dummy  variables  indicate  that  there  remain  important
location-specific determinants of household welfare which were not captured by the model.
Columns 2 and 3 show the results of adding respectively a multiplicative and an
additive index of social capital to the specification.'  Of the two indexes only the additive
specification has  a coefficient significantly different from zero.  The coefficient of the
social capital index indicates that an increase of 10 points on the index is associated with a
5.7% increase in household welfare.
Column 3 indicates that an increase in the household's  stock of human capital of
one  year is  associated with  an  increase in  household welfare  of approximately 4.5%.
Among the sample households, the average stock of human capital equals four years so
this corresponds to  a  25% increase.  A similar increase in  the index of  social capital
(average= 23.6)  is  associated with  an  increase  of  3.4% of  household  welfare.  This
Significance  tests indicated  that the additive  index with four dimensions  performed  better than the one
with  six dimensions,  hence  only  the results  of the former  are shown  here.
37suggests that the returns to education are of similar magnitude to the returns of social
capital.  17
The last column of Table 21 introduces the six social capital dimensions separately.
This leads to a slight increase in the model's ability to explain the variance of household
welfare relative to the index approach. More importantly, it shows the relative importance
of the different dimensions.  The results indicate that active membership in an agrarian
syndicate is associated with an 11.5% higher level of household welfare.  Membership in
another association leads to a 5.3% increase in welfare. Active investments by households
in associations - measured by attending meetings, making cash or in-kind contributions
- as well as a strong community orientation are all associated with higher welfare levels,
although the coefficients are fairly small.'s
In the context of the model which we discussed in section 3, the coefficient of
membership  is  interpreted as  the  benefit  of  membership  in  local  associations.  It  is
possible, however, that there is reverse causation.  High income households might have a
higher  demand  for  associational  life  because  they  have  more  leisure  (although  the
opportunity cost to their time is also higher).  One can certainly argue that associational
life has a consumption value and is not sought merely for its economic benefit.  Clearly
this is related to the type of association:  participating in a church choir or a soccer club
may have more  consumption  value than the  agrarian  syndicate  or  other  professional
associations.  We address later (section 8) formally the question of reverse causation with
instrumental variables.
The results in Table 21 indicate that the heterogeneity index is not a significant
social capital dimension, which is a different result from that obtained for Indonesia and
Burkina Faso (Grootaert, 1999; Grootaert, Oh and Swamy, 1999).  As has been noted in
the previous section, the heterogeneity index in Bolivia is in-between that of the two other
countries.  However, also as noted before, neither heterogeneity in language nor ethnicity,
both critical indicators, could be included in our heterogeneity index.  As the qualitative
data  shows,  ethnicity  in  the  Bolivian  context  does  matter.  It  appears  that  other
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics are not important criteria for membership
in associations and bear no relation to the effectiveness of the association.  A noteworthy
17  Strictly speaking the coefficient  of human capital cannot be interpreted  as the returns to education
because  we do not employ  the standard  Mincerian  formulation  of the human  capital model. The term
"return" is used here to indicate the partial effect of a one unit increase in the stock of human oT social
capital on household welfare.
18  The regression model distinguishes membership in agrarian syndicates from other memberships because
the organizations have different historical origins and because the extent of membership is very different.
The variables describing the other social capital dimensions, however, do not make that distinction.  As
Table 20  indicated, there are no  fundamental differences  in social  capital characteristics  in terms  of
heterogeneity, meeting attendance, etc., between syndicates and other organizations.  We did however
estimate the regression model distinguishing between syndicates and other organizations for each of the
six social capital dimensions.  The empirical results indicated that among the syndicate characteristics,
only membership was significant and that the other attributes of the syndicates did not have a significant
impact on the outcome variables.  We therefore distinguish in Table 22 and following tables syndicates
and other associations only in the membership variable.
38result is the negative and significant coefficient of the index of participation.  This result
too  stands in  contrast  to  that obtained  for the other  two countries  in  the LLI study.
Looking back at Tables 19 and 20 makes clear why this is the case:  active participation in
the decision making of associations is strongest among poorer households, especially in
Mizque and Charagua.  (Incidentally, the negative sign of the participation index and the
lack of significance of the heterogeneity index explain why the additive model excluding
these two components performs better than the index which consists of all six components
and why the multiplicative index fails to be significant.)
Table 21:  Household Welfare and Social Capital (OLS regressions)'
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Intercept  6.8349  (46.82)  6.8358  (46.13)  6.6722  (44.08)  6.7383  42.58
Social Capital Index
- Multiplicative index 2 -0.0001  (0.04)
- Additive index 3 0.005 7 (4 .39) -
Social Capital Dimensions
- Membership  in agrarian  - - - 0.1153  (2.29)
syndicates
- Number  of other memberships  - - _  0.0529  (2.54)
- Heterogeneity index  - - - -0.0002  (0.29)
- Meeting attendance  - - - 0.0107  (3.63)
- Index  of participation  - - - -0.0021  (3.50)
- Index of contribution  - - - 0.0068  (3.99)
- Community orientation  - - - 0.0013  (3.01)
Household Size  -0.1449  (17.18)  -0.1449  (17.17)  -0.1459  (17.42)  -0.1470  (17.42)
Years of Education  0.0468  (7.65)  0.0469  (7.59)  0.0453  (7.45)  0.0453  (7.41)
Female Head of Household  -0.1027  (1.78)  -0.1028  (1.79)  -0.1084  (1.90)  -0.0993  (1.76)
Age of Head of Household  0.0288  (4.69)  0.0288  (4.69)  0.0294  (4.78)  0.0287  (4.63)
Age of Head of Household Squared  -0.0003  (4.06)  -0.0003  (4.05)  -0.0003  (4.09)  -0.0002  (3.97)
Non-Farmer Household  0.0820  (1.47)  0.0820  (1.47)  0.0829  (1.51)  0.0828  (1.55)
Land Ownership (hectare)  0.0033  (3.59)  0.0033  (3.59)  0.0028  (3.16)  0.0024  (2.85)
Animal Ownership (number)  0.0012  (2.68)  0.0012  (2.68)  0.0012  (2.68)  0.0013  (2.91)
Farm Equipment Ownership (number)  0.1053  (2.78)  0.1054  (2.79)  0.0932  (2.47)  0.0925  (2.49)
Villa Serrano  -0.0385  (0.80)  -0.0387  (0.80)  -0.0061  (0.13)  -0.0208  (0.42)
Mizque  0.4734  (9.89)  0.4729  (9.39)  0.4763  (9.90)  0.4701  (8.99)
Charagua  0.2612  (4.63)  0.2606  (4.40)  0.3123  (5.46)  0.3106  (4.72)
Municipality's Capital City  0.3933  (6.35)  0.3931  (6.31)  0.4191  (6.84)  0.4346  (6.95)
Number of Observations  999  999  999  999
R-squared  0.41  0.41  0.42  0.43
F-statistic  49.2  45.7  48.1  38.5
Notes:  1.  The dependent variable = In (household expenditure per capita); t-statistics are in parentheses and are based on
robust standard errors (Hubert-White estimator for non-identically distributed residuals).
2.  The multiplicative index is the product of the number of memberships, the heterogeneity index and the participation
index, re-scaled 0 tolOO.
3.  The additive index is the arithmetic average of the number of memberships, meeting attendance, the contribution
index and the comimunity  orientation index.
Regional Differences
Given the regional  differences in  ethnicity, geography, history  and relative prosperity,
reinforced by the high coefficients of the locational dummy variables, and to tease out the
institutional story, we thought it would be worthwhile to estimate regressions separately
for  each  municipality  and  for  rural residents  and  those  of  the  capital  cities  of  the
39municipalities.  Table 22  shows  that  the  relative  role  of  the  different  social  capital
dimensions is indeed different between rural and urban areas. Overall, the returns to social
capital in local institutions appear to be higher in cities than in rural areas.  While an active
membership in an agrarian syndicate leads to a 9% higher level of household welfare in
rural areas, in the cities this corresponds to an increase of 36%.  For other associations the
respective figures are 4.5%  and 17.5%.  These differences need to be  interpreted with
caution.  The urban  sample is small (only  100 households) and  active membership in
agrarian syndicates is low.  The few urban residents who are farners  and members of
agrarian syndicates are likely to be very different from the typical rural campesino.
Table 22:  Household Welfare and Social Capital, by Location
Rural  Areas  Municipality  Capital
Cities
Social  Capital  Index (additive)  0.0055  (3.98)  0.0077  (1.94)
Social Capital Dimensions
- Membership  in agrarian  syndicates  0.0906  (1.67)  0.3611  (2.09)
- Number  of other  memberships  0.0454  (2.08)  0.1753  (2.04)
- Heterogeneity  index  -0.0003  (0.34)  0.0023  (0.88)
-Meeting attendance  0.0110  (3.65)  -0.0162  (0.93)
- Index  of participation  -0.0016  (2.46)  -0.0060  (3.15)
-Index  of contribution  0.0065  (3.67)  -0.0031  (0.37)
- Community  orientation  0.0012  (2.56)  0.0020  (1.65)
We also re-estimated the regression model for each municipality separately as well
as  for combinations of  municipalities along  the institutional  dimensions identified  in
Figure 1.  Looking at the results for each municipality, the additive social capital index is
only  significant in  Villa  Serrano and  Charagua (Table 23).  These two  provinces  are
characterized by a weak institutional tradition. In Villa Serrano the agrarian syndicates are
not well established because the haciendas survived the 1952 revolution.  In Charagua, the
Assembly of the Guarani People has only been formally established since 1987. However,
as discussed earlier, this weak institutional tradition also explains why the incidence and
membership  of  other  local  institutions  is  higher  in  Villa  Serrano  and  in  Charagua.
Furthermnore,  since the agrarian syndicates are so weak, they lay little claim on the human
resources available in the region which are therefore available to strengthen the functioning
of other local organizations (Sandoval et al, 1998).
The results of the individual municipality regressions confirm the importance of
non-syndicate organizations in Villa Serrano and Charagua since these are the only two
provinces where  there is a positive and significant relationship between membership in
other local associations and household welfare level.  However, the results also indicate
that  in  none  of  the  four  municipalities, active membership  in  agrarian  syndicates  is
significantly related to  household welfare.  The fact that  we found  such a  significant
relation at the national level means therefore that this is largely due to inter-municipality
effects.  In particular, Mizque is the province with the highest income  as well as the
highest active membership in agrarian syndicates.
40Table 23: Household Welfare and Social Capital, by Municipality
Tiahuanacu  Villa Serrano  Charagua  Mizque
Social Capital  hidex  (additive)  0.0029  (0.90)  0.0115  (4.78)  0.0063  (2.94)  -0.0024  (0.87)
Social Capital  Dimensions
- Membership  in agrarian
syndicates  -0.1244  (1.07)  0.0877  (0.93)  0.1095  (1.33)  0.0960  (0.55)
- Number of other memberships  0.0277  (0.65)  0.0756  (2.70)  0.1097  (2.10)  0.0101  (0.15)
- Heterogeneity  index  0.0037  (1.73)  -0.0045  (3.55)  0.0038  (2.40)  -0.0019  (0.92)
- Meeting  attendance  -0.0001  (0.01)  0.0195  (3.76)  0.0060  (1.86)  0.0182  (2.64)
- Index  of participation  -0.0023  (1.45)  0.0010  (0.84)  -0.0057  (5.31)  -0.0030  (2.05)
- Index of contribution  0.0124  (4.49)  0.0150  (3.06)  0.0027  (0.98)  0.0035  (0.78)
- Community  orientation  0.0010  (1.19)  0.0029  (2.85)  0.0023  (2.89)  -0.0005  (0.65)
Tiahuanacu  and  Villa Serrano  and  Mizque  and  Tiabuanacu  and
Mizque  Charagas  Charagua  Villa Serrano
(strong  (weak  institutional  (strong leadership  (weak  leadership
institutional  tradition)  and municipal  and municipal
r_  adition)  effectiveness)  effectiveness)
Social Capital  Index (additive)  0.0014  (0.64)  0.001  (5.05)  0.0032  (1.86)  0.0083  (4.17)
Social Capital  Dimensions
- Membership in agrarian
syndicates  -0.0585  (0.60)  0.1314  (2.27)  0.1312  (1.72)  0.0731  (1.04)
-Numberofothermemberships  -0.0033  (0.10)  0.0758  (3.00)  0.0826  (1.99)  0.0486  (2.00)
- Heterogeneity  index  0.0012  (0.88)  -0.0013  (1.28)  0.0009  (0.77)  -0.0012  (1.15)
-Meeting  attendance  0.0136  (1.94)  0.0094  (3.53)  0.0107  (3.05)  0.0119  (2.33)
- idex  of participation  -0.0025  (2.52)  -0.0021  (2.60)  -0.0037  (4.58)  -0.0002  (0.17)
- Index of contribution  0.0097  (4.40)  0.0047  (1.76)  0.0043  (1.93)  0.0111  (3.94)
- Communtyorentation  0.0001  (0.22)  0.0023  (3.80)  0.0007  (1.312  0.0019  (2.79)
The case of Mizque is of further interest.  Mizque is the municipality where the
agrarian syndicates are most effective and where they are the primary channel of delivery
of various services to households. Active membership in the agrarian syndicates is almost
universal and there is hence less need for other local institutions.  The regression results for
Mizque indicate that no single social capital dimension is significant except for meeting
attendance. This result is puzzling because one could argue that in an environment where
everyone is member, free riding could presumably be high. But Mizque is also a small area
with high face to face interaction even in the town.  In this environment, in a context of
high membership, the ability of households to obtain benefits of this situation may depend
on their presence at meetings.  Mizque is also one of two municipalities where active
participation in decision making is inversely related to income.
At the national level we found that there is no systematic relationship between the
heterogeneity index and household welfare.  The municipality results, however, indicate
that heterogeneity is a significant dimension of associational life, but not everywhere in the
same direction.  In Tiahuanacu and Charagua, more heterogeneity is positively associated
with higher income but in Villa Serrano and Mizque it is negatively related (although the
relationship is  statistically significant only  in  Villa  Serrano).  The  reasons for  these
differences are not immediately clear and need to be explored further.  The finding is
probably related to the ethnic or linguistic composition of the population (which was not
included in the index).  Villa Serrano, where the relation is most pronouncedly negative, is
largely  populated  by  the  Quechua indigenous  groups, although  that  group is  largely
hispanicized and the majority of the population speaks Spanish.  However, Spanish is also
the predominant language in Charagua where the relationship between heterogeneity and
41income is strongly positive (note, however, that the population of Charagua is split about
50-50 between  indigenous and  other people).  Mizque  and  Tiahuanacu  are the most
ethnically homogeneous municipalities with predominantly indigenous people,  but  the
relation  between  heterogeneity  and  household  welfare  is  not  the  same  in  the  two
municipalities.
We noted earlier the negative correlation between participation in decision making
and household welfare, reflecting the fact that the poor participate more actively than the
rich.  This result is predominantly due to Mizque and Charagua, and in this regard the
regressions  confirm  the  earlier  tabular  results  (see Table 19).  The  importance  of
community initiation of local  associations is  strongest in  Villa  Serrano and  Charagua,
which as we  discussed  earlier are the two municipalities with  the weakest traditional
institutions and hence the highest membership in non-syndicate local associations.
A fuller social capital story emerges when municipalities are paired according to
the  strength  of  traditional  institutions,  strength  of  regional  leadership  and  linkage
organizations and presence of effective municipal govermnent, i.e., along the dimensions
of Figure 1.
The  regressions  of  pairs  of  municipalities  suggest  that  all  these  institutional
dimensions identified in Figure I are relevant in explaining the impact of local institutions
on household welfare. Comparing Tiahuanacu and Mizque where institutional traditions
are strong with Villa Serrano and Charagua where institutional traditions are weak, it is
clear that in the latter context, the active membership of households in agrarian syndicates
and other local associations explains variations in household welfare to a much stronger
degree.  Community initiation and involvement in the associations as indicated by meeting
attendance and making large contributions are strong positive factors.  In Tiahuanacu and
Mizque  in  contrast, membership in  local associations per  se,  regardless of  type  (i.e.,
whether they are syndicates or not, whether they are community or state initiated) does not
matter, and differential effects on household welfare are due to differences in the degree of
involvement by households in the affairs of the associations through meeting attendance
and contributions.
Comparing Tiahuanacu and Villa Serrano where regional leadership and municipal
effectiveness are  weak  with  Mizque  and  Charagua where  leadership  and  municipal
govermment  are strong, the results indicate that the latter situation contributes to a stronger
positive  correlation between  membership in  local  associations and  household welfare.
This may reflect the  complementarity between the actions of  local associations and  a
municipal government which is responsive to local needs.
Is Social Capital a Pro-poor Asset?
So far we have provided evidence that several dimensions of social capital and particular
combinations of institutions have positive effects on household welfare.  However, since
equation (1) imposes constant parameters over the entire distribution, the results do not say
whether social capital helps the poor to the same degree as the rich and whether investment
in social capital can help poor groups escape from poverty.  In this context, it is important
42to  note  that  the  'ownership'  of  social capital  (as  measured by  membership in  local
associations and  its  different dimensions) is much more equally distributed than other
types of assets (Table 24).
Table 24:  Ownership of Assets, by Quintile of Household Expenditure per Capita
Quintile
Poorest  2  3  4  Richest  All
Social  Capital  Index
- Multiplicative  index  19.7  20.1  20.2  18.2  16.2  18.9
- Additive  index  21.4  22.7  24.1  24.7  25.0  23.6
Years  of Education  3.3  3.8  3.9  4.1  4.5  3.9
Land  Ownership  (hectare)  2.7  3.9  2.9  2.7  4.8  3.4
Animal  Ownership  (number)  19.1  16.6  19.9  19.4  22.4  19.5
Farm Equipment  Ownership  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5
(number)
Household  Durables  1.7  1.9  2.2  2.4  3.0  2.2
The poorest quintile of households has only 3.3 years of education against 4.5 years
for the richest quintile.  Land and household durables are distributed more unequally.  In
contrast, the additive social capital index is only slightly below average for the poorest
quintile and the multiplicative index is even above average. The question remains whether
this accumulation of social assets by the poor is rational, in the sense that it indeed helps
them escape poverty or at least provides them with relatively higher returns than other
assets.
We address this question in several ways. First, we estimated a probit model of the
likelihood to be poor.19 The results indicate that social capital can significantly reduce the
probability to be poor (Table 25).  A household which is an active member of an agrarian
syndicate has  a  14% lower probability to  be  poor than  a  similar household  with  no
membership.  Membership in another local organization reduces the probability to be poor
by 2.8%.  This 5:1 ratio is much higher than the 2:1 ratio we found earlier between the
coefficients measuring the impact on household welfare, indicating that there is a stronger
correlation between active membership in an agrarian syndicate and poverty status than
between membership  and welfare level in  general.  This  could  either reflect a strong
poverty reducing effect resulting from the activities of agrarian syndicates, but it could also
reflect that the syndicates are not always open to the poor and exclude them from active
membership.
19 The poverty  line  was set at two-thirds  of median  household  expenditure  per capita.
43Table 25:  Social Capital and the Probability to be Poor (probit estimation)
Impact  on the Probability  to be Poor'
Social Capital Dimensions
- Membership in agrarian syndicates  -0.1405  (3.60)
- Number of other memberships  -0.0284  (2.15)
- Heterogeneity index  0.0009  (1.76)
- Meeting attendance  -0.0083  (2.83)
- Index of participation  0.0006  (1.54)
- Index of contribution  -0.0021  (1.21)
- Community orientation  -0.0002  (0.86)
Household Size  0.0500  (9.55)
Years of Education  -0.0214  (4.46)
Female Head of Household  0.0955  (2.38)
Age of Head of Household  -0.0125  (3.49)
Age of Head of Household Squared  0.0001  (3.47)
Non-Farmer Household  -0.0358  (1.06)
Land Ownership (hectare)  -0.0029  (1.23)
Animal Ownership (number)  -0.0003  (0.85)
Farm Equipment Ownership (number)  -0.0168  (0.66)
Villa Serrano  0.0389  (1.15)
Mizque  -0.0943  (3.00)
Charagua  -0.0882  (2.31)
Municipality's Capital City  -0.1230  (3.57)
Number of Observations  999
Log Likelihood  -372.5
Chi-squared  137.05
Probability > Chi-squared  0.0000
Probability derivatives at  the mean of each explanatory variable (or for  0 to  1 change for
dunimy variables) and z-scores based on robust standard errors.
Quantile  regressions  are  a further  way  to explore  differences  in the  role  of social
capital  between  the  poor  and  the rich.  Quantile  regressions  estimate  the  regression  line
through  given  points  on  the  distribution  of  the  dependent  variable  (whilst  an  OLS
regression  line  goes  through  the  mean)  and  can  assess  whether  certain  explanatory
variables  are  weaker  or  stronger  in  different  parts  of  the  distribution.  However,  the
coefficients  of  quantile  regressions  are  conditional  upon  the  values  of  the  explanatory
variables,  and hence  coefficients  from  quantile  regressions  are not  comparable  with  those
of OLS regressions.2 0
The  results  from  quantile  regressions  (Table 26)  confirm  that  the  importance  of
social  capital  and its specific  dimensions  is not the same  across  the  distribution.  Looking
at the  additive  index,  it appears  that  the correlation  between  social  capital  and  household
welfare  decreases  as one moves  to higher levels  of the distribution.  An active  membership
of an agrarian  syndicate  is most  critical  for people  located  between  the  25th percentile  and
20  Specifically, the coefficients show the effect of a marginal change in an explanatory variable on
the xd' conditional quantile of the dependent variable (Buchinsky, 1998).
44the  median  of  the  distribution.  Given  that  the  poor  are  practically  excluded  from
memberships in  two municipalities, this  result makes sense. As  a  substitute however,
membership of local organizations, are most critical for the people in the lowest 25% of the
distribution.  The importance of attending meetings is highest at the  25th  percentile and
gradually  declines  after  that.  It  is  quite  remarkable that  the  coefficient of  index of
contribution gradually declines as one moves up the distribution.  This indicates that the
payoff of a dollar's  worth of membership fee or a day worked as in-kind contribution is
highest  for the  poorest  and  declines  after that.  These results  strongly underline  the
importance, not only of membership, but of active participation in the activities of the
association.
Table 26:  Social Capital and the Distribution of Household Welfare
(quantile regressions)
Quantile  of the Distribution  of Household  Welfare
10  25  50  75  90
(median)
Social  Capital  Index (additive)  0.0059*  0.0052*  0.0055*  0.0055*  0.0044*
Social Capital Dimensions
- Membership  in agrarian  syndicates  0.0366  0.1564*  0.1240*  0.0851  0.0209
- Number  of other  memberships  0.0568*  0.0613*  0.0284  0.0431  0.0574
- Heterogeneity  index  0.0008  -0.0019*  -0.0002  0.0015  0.0005
- Meeting  attendance  0.0080*  0.0123*  0.0097*  0.0076*  0.0071
- Index  of participation  -0.0010  -0.0016*  -0.0023*  -0.0036*  -0.0014
- Index  of contribution  0.0135*  0.0103*  0.0082*  0.0061  *  0.0011
- Community  orientation  0.0008  0.0010  0.0015*  0.0014*  0.0009
Years  of Education  0.0467*  0.0444*  0.0512*  0.0376*  0.0424*
Land  Ownership  (hectares)  0.0000  0.0030*  0.0022*  0.0010  0.0059*
Animal  Ownership  (number)  0.0006  0.0022*  0.0020*  0.0017*  0.0010*
Farner Equipment  Ownership  0.1064*  0.1056*  0.0751  *  0.0900  0.0516
(number)  I_I_I
Note:  Entries are  coefficients of  quantile regressions through the X  quantile of  the
distribution  of household  expenditure  per capita. Asterisk  indicates  significance  at the
90% confidence  level.
A third way to  assess whether the impact of social capital on household welfare
varies across the distribution, is to split the sample according to households' endowment of
assets.  In the rural setting of the study area, land is clearly a key asset to households and
we  split the sample households according to  whether they had  less or more than one
hectare of land (Table 27).
The results  indicate that  the correlation between  social capital  and household
welfare is almost twice as strong for smallholders than for households with more land.
The critical difference is in memberships in non-syndicate local organizations which are
associated with an 8.3% increase in household welfare for smallholders against only 3.6%
for households with more land. In contrast, the effect of active membership in an agrarian
syndicate goes the other way.  It is much higher for households with more than one hectare
of land.
45Table 27:  Social Capital and Land Ownership
<=  L ha  > i ha
Social Capital Index (Additive)  0.0071  (3.53)  0.0039  (2.34)
Social Capital Dimensions
- Membership  in agrarian  syndicates  0.0858  (1.05)  0.1364  (2.07)
- Number  of other  memberships  0.0831  (2.16)  0.0359  (1.46)
- Heterogeneity  index  0.0001  (0.01)  -0.0005  (0.47)
- Meeting  attendance  0.0193  (2.88)  0.0059  (1.77)
- Index  of participation  -0.0026  (2.95)  -0.0022  (2.75)
- Index of contribution  0.0077  (4.28)  0.0063  (1.99)
- Community  orientation  0.0014  (2.09)  0.0010  (1.76)
Entries  are OLS  coefficients  and t-statistics  based on robust  standard  errors.
In  summary,  the  results  of  this  section  indicate  that  memberships  in  local
associations contribute to higher household welfare and to reducing the probability to be
poor.  Returns to this social capital are generally higher for households in the lower half of
the distribution and for smallholders.  Which association matters most  depends on the
location, and is a function of the effectiveness of local government and the strength of
institutional traditions.  Where agrarian syndicates are weak, membership in  other local
associations  tends  to  be  strong,  and  vice  versa.  This  relation  of  substitution  and
complementarity also occurs at the level of the household:  the middle class and better-
landed households benefit more from agrarian syndicates, while the poor benefit most from
other local institutions.
468.  THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL:  ASSET ACCUMULATION, ACCESS TO
CREDIT, COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE,  AND  COLLECTIVE ACTION
Asset Accumulation
So far we have concentrated on the impact of local associations on current income as
proxied by expenditure per capita.  However, in  a relatively poor rural setting, a prime
consideration for households is to have available coping strategies to deal with the risk of
income fluctuations.  Accumulating assets which can be sold or borrowed against in time
of  need  or  arranging  access to  credit  are  important  components  of  such  strategies.
Households' ownership of consumer durable goods is one measure of the extent to which
households have been able to save and accumulate assets.  As we saw earlier (Table 6), the
accumulation of household durables in the study areas is at a low level.  Out of a list of 15
such assets, the average household owned only 2.2 assets.
We aggregated this  information into  a  durable  goods ownership score  for the
household using weights derived from a principal component analysis of the 15 variables.
Re-estimating equation (1) with this ownership score as dependent variable provides an
assessment whether social capital has contributed to  asset accumulation and long-term
increases  in  household  welfare.  The  results  (column 1,  Table 28)  indicate  a  strong
correlation between membership in local organizations and ownership of durable goods.
Active membership in an agrarian syndicate is associated with an increase in the ownership
score  of  0.076  (an  increase  of  12.1%), while  membership  in  other  organizations is
associated with  an increase of 0.046 (an increase of 7.3%).  The results  for the other
dimensions are similar to those for current consumption, with the most important positive
effect coming from meeting attendance.  It is again noteworthy that the effect of human
capital (years of education) is almost identical to that of social capital as measured by
membership in organizations.  The demographic and locational control variables in this
equation show however very different results for the accumulation of durable goods as
opposed to current expenditure.  Specifically, female-headed households are at a much
greater disadvantage, while non-farmer households have  a much  greater  advantage in
accumulating assets,  controlling  for  all  other  characteristics.  Among  the  locational
variables, accumulation is much higher in cities than in rural areas although the differences
between municipalities are smaller than was the case for current consumption.
Another aspect of asset accumulation is the ability to have savings.  While the LLI
questionnaire did not record the amount of savings, it did ask whether households had been
able to increase savings in the past year.  Households with more memberships in local
associations were  significantly more  able to  do  so than  others  (column 2,  Table 28).
Membership in  an agrarian syndicate was associated with  a 4.8% higher probability of
having increased savings, whilst  the effect of  membership in  another  association was
associated with a 2.0% increase in this probability. We also tested whether membership in
an association with specific financial objectives, for example, a rotating credit and savings
association, made a difference. This did not tum out to be the case.  The sample contained
47very few households with such memberships and none of them had been able to increase
their savings in the past year.
Table 28: Social Capital and Asset Accumulation
Durable  Goods  Increasing  Savings 2
Ownership'
Intercept  0.0261  (0.22)
Social Capital Dimension
- Membership  in agrarian  syndicates  0.0760  (1.75)  0.0484  (1.84)
- Number  of other  memberships  0.0456  (2.62)  0.0198  (2.04)
- Heterogeneity  index  -0.0005  (0.73)  0.0004  (0.821
- Meeting  attendance  0.0048  (1.66)  0.0040  (2.97)
- Index of participation  -0.0011  (2.08)  -0.0008  (2.70)
- Index  of contribution  0.0017  (0.83)  -0.0016  (1.53)
- Cornmunity  orientation  -0.0000  (0.00)  -0.0000  (0.03)
Household  Size  0.0041  (0.68)  -0.0050  (1.29)
Years  of Education  0.0454  (7.38)  0.0150  (4.30)
Female  Head of Household  -0.1858  (4.32)  -0.0380  (1.42)
Age of head of Household  0.0134  (3.14)  -0.0038  (1.38)
Age  of Head of Household  Squared  -0.0001  (2.73)  0.0000  (1.06)
Non-Farmer  Household  0.1669  (3.60)  0.0330  (1.29)
Land  Ownership  (hectare)  -0.0003  (0.37)  -0.0003  (0.64)
Animal  Ownership  (number)  0.0018  (2.98)  0.0000  (0.10)
Farm Equipment  Ownership  (number)  0.1261  (3.86)  0.0283  (1.72)
Villa Serrano  -0.1978  (4.84)  0.0434  (1.54)
Mizque  -0.0038  (0.08)  0.0331  (1.16)
Charagua  -0.1741  (3.07)  0.0427  (1.20)
Municipality's  Capital  City  0.5414  (8.05)  -0.0054  (0.  19)
Number  of Observations  999
R-squared  0.36
F-statistic  20.1
Log Likelihood  _  -274.1
Chi-squared  65.0
Pr > chi-squared  0.0000
Notes: 1.  OLS model with durable  goods score (principal  component  weights) as dependent
variable;  reported  are coefficients  and t-values  based on robust standard  errors.
2.  Probit model of households  who increased  savings in the past year; reported are
probability  derivatives  at the mean  of the explanatory  variables  (or for 0 to 1 change
in the case of dummy  variables)  and z-scores  based on robust standard  errors.
Access to Credit and Community Assistance
Access to credit is still at a fairly low level in Bolivia and does not seem to be strongly
related with the ability to provide collateral.  Among households who owned one hectare
or  less of  land,  about 20%  of households  obtained  credit  in  the past  year.  Among
households with larger land holdings, 22% obtained credit.  The analysis of access to credit
in Indonesia and Burkina Faso indicated that local associations, regardless of whether the
48provision of financial services was the prime objective, played a  key role in  ensuring
access to  credit.  The results  of Table29  suggest that this is not  the case in Bolivia.
Overall, the regression explaining the probability of obtaining credit showed only very low
correlation  with  any  of  the  social  capital  variables,  as  well  as  with  most  of  the
characteristics of the households. 21 However, a noteworthy result is that larger and female-
headed households are more likely to receive credit.  Nevertheless, the key factor seems to
be  location.  Specifically, being a resident  of the municipality of  Mizque provides a
significant increase in the probability of obtaining credit.  This municipality indeed has
various local associations that specialize in this activity.
As we mentioned earlier, there are very few households in the sample who are
members of an  association with  explicit financial objectives.  However, the results in
Table 29 do suggest that these associations achieved their objective since such membership
is associated with a 22% increase in the probability to obtain credit.
In addition to inquiring about credit, the LLI questionnaire also asked households
whether they thought they would be able to get assistance from people in the community
other than relatives or friends in case of need.  Sixty-four percent of households answered
that they "definitely" or "probably" would be able to get such assistance.  Among those,
22% listed community organizations as the first source where they would turn to for such
help.  Column  2  in  Table 29  suggests that  households  who  are  members  of  local
organizations are more likely to have faith in 'the community as a source of help.  This is
not at all related to the characteristics or the wealth of the household, but it is strongly
influenced by the  location.  Households in  Tiahuanacu are least  likely to  turn  to  the
community for help, while those in Charagua are most likely to do so.
21  A Tobit regression explaining the amount of credit obtained yielded a similar result.
49Table  29:  Social Capital  and Access to Credit  and Community  Assistance
Credit 1 Community Assistance
Social Capital Dimension
- Membership in financial
associations  0.2177  (1.63)
- Membership in agrarian syndicates  -0.0356  (0.84)  0.0433  (1.57)
- Number of other memberships  0.0174  (1.01)  0.0282  (2.58)
- Heterogeneity index  0.0008  (1.15)  -0.0007  (1.37)
- Meeting attendance  -0.0035  (1.34)  0.0019  (1.26)
- Index of participation  -0.0001  (0.11)  0.0004  (1.04')
- Index of contribution  0.0016  (0.89)  0.0016  (1.53)
- Community orientation  -0.0005  (1.45)  0.0009  (3.34)
Household Size  0.0207  (3.45)  0.0074  (1.73)
Years of Education  -0.0029  (0.57)  0.0029  (0.69)
Female Head of Household  0.0821  (1.86)  -0.0372  (1.19)
Age of head of Household  -0.0040  (0.73)  0.0020  (0.49)
Age of Head of Household Squared  0.0000  (0.35)  -0.0000  (0.56)
Non-Farmer Household  0.0272  (0.65)  -0.0240  (0.86)
Land Ownership (hectare)  _  -0.0018  (1.27)
Animal Ownership (number)  -0.0001  (0.57)
Farm Equipment Ownership (number)  - 0.0251  (1.13)
Villa Serrano  0.0221  (0.54)  0.2920  (5.301
Mizque  0.0940  (2.14)  0.1737  (3.40;
Charagua  -0.0888  (1.92)  0.4418  (6.36)
Municipality's Capital City  -0.0048  (0.10)  0.1479  (3.09)
Number of Observations  999  999
Log Likelihood  -495.9  -339.8
Chi-squared  44.7  117.0
Pr > Chi-squared  0.0005  0.0000
Notes:  1. Probit model with receipt of credit as dependent variable; reported are probability
derivatives at the mean of the explanatory variables (or for 0 to I change in the case
of dummy variables) and z-scores based  on robust standard errors.  Physical assets
variables were excluded from the specification because ownership of such assets is
arguable endogenous to obtaining credit, since credit is often used to buy assets.
2. Probit model of the probability to select a community organization as first or second
choice to receive assistance, conditional upon the perception of a high likelihood to
receive assistance in case of need.  Reported are probability derivatives at the mean
of the explanatory variables (or for 0 to  1 change in the case of dummy variables)
and z-scores based on robust standard errors.
Collective  Action
In  addition  to  contributing  to  asset  accumulation  and  to  improving  access  to  credit  and
assistance,  social  capital  has  also  been  documented  to  aid  in  collective  action  and
collective  decision  making.  This  is  especially  relevant  in rural  settings  where  comnmTon
property  resources  such  as  water,  forestry  or  grazing  land  need  to  be  managed  by  the
50community (Narayan, 1995; Uphoff, 1992).  We regressed the number of times per year
households participated in collective action against the social capital variables and the
usual control variables (Table 30).  On average, a Bolivian household participates 9 times
per year in collective action.  However, households who are active members of agrarian
syndicates are likely to  do this  1I  times, while households who are members of other
associations are likely to do this  10.4 times.  This attests again to the "social" nature of
social capital.  Networks and interactions engaged in as part of social, religious, financial,
or other objectives spill over in higher participation in activities that benefit the community
at large.
Table 30: Social Capital and Collective Action
Household  Village
Intercept  11.3959  (2.72)  32.4450  (0.56)
Social Capital Dimensions
Membership  in agrarian  syndicates  1.9328  (1.16)  13.5175  (1.81)
Number  of other  memberships  1.4479  (2.07)  2.9119  (0.86)
Heterogeneity  index  -0.0472  (1.89)  -0.0017  (0.01)
Meeting  attendance  0.3255  (2.35)  0.8657  (1.47)
Index  of participation  0.0106  (0.68)  -0.0608  (0.56)
Index  of contribution  0.0886  (1.61)  0.5676  (0.87)
Community  orientation  -0.0077  (0.76)  -0.1377  (1.57)
Household  Size  0.0663  (0.35)  0.1018  (0.05)
Years  of Education  0.0570  (0.36)  -1.5303  (1.20)
Female  Head of Household  -2.4505  (1.83)  -19.4789  (1.18)
Age of Head of Household  0.0224  (0.15)  -0.5183  (0.20)
Age of Head of Household  Squared  0.0000  (0.01)  0.0052  (0.18)
Non-Farmer  Household  -0.7780  (0.67)  10.1704  (1.73)
Land  Ownership  (hectare)  -0.0190  (1.03)  0.1271  (0.31)
Animal  Ownership  (number)  -0.0221  (2.82)  -0.1290  (1.10)
Farm Equipment  Ownership  (number)  0.6830  (0.82)  -0.9767  (0.18)
Villa Serrano  -6.3092  (4.05)  -8.8423  (1.68)
Mizque  -7.3358  (4.75)  -8.8985  (2.41)
Charagua  -5.4669  (3.10)  4.5850  (0.91)
Municipality's  Capital  City  -5.7362  (4.44)  -2.1470  (0.49)
Number  of Observations  974  40
R-squared  0.10  0.69
F-statistic  6.74  5.53
Notes:  Dependent  variable  is the number  of times a household  participated  in collective  action
during the last year.  Reported are OLS-coefficients  and t-statistics  based on robust
standard  errors.
However, one result in Table 30 is distinctly different from what we found earlier.
We have noted that in general the internal heterogeneity of local associations in Bolivia
does  not  bear  a  strong  relation  to  outcomes,  whether  current  expenditure  or  asset
accumulation or access to credit.  In the case of collective action, however, the highest
participation in collective action comes from members of internally more homogenous
associations.  This result was also found in the case of Indonesia (Grootaert, 1998) and
51points  to  a potential conflict between the interests of the households and those of the
community.  We  have  explored  these results  further  to  identify  which  of  the  nine
dimensions that make up the heterogeneity index are most important in causing this result
and  it  turns  out  that  collective  action  is  the  highest  in  associations  that  are  most
homogenous according to kin, age, and education.
It is also worth noting that female-headed households are significantly less likely to
participate in collective action than other households.  There are also important locational
effects.  Collective action is more likely to take place in rural areas than in cities and it is
most predominant in the municipality of Tiahuanacu.
Given that by nature collective action is organized at the level of the community,
we also estimated the collective action regression using the village as unit of observation.
The results largely confirm those of the household-level regression but they do highlight
the role of  agrarian  syndicates:  villages with  high  membership in  the  syndicates are
significantly more likely to organize collective action.
Household versus Village Effects
Lastly, we wish to address to the question whether social capital operates primarily at the
household level or at the village level.  The earlier cited study on Tanzania by Narayan and
Pritchett (1997) concluded that social capital is primarily a village effect, based  on the
significance of the social capital variables in village regressions.  When we re-estimate
equation (1) using the village as unit of observation, we find mixed results  (results not
reported  here). 22 The  additive  social  capital  index  is  significant  in  a  village-level
regression but the separate  social capital dimensions are not.  The sole, but  important
exception is the community orientation variable which is positively related to the welfare
level  of the village.  These results suggest that in Bolivia  social capital exhibits some
village-level  externalities, but  that the  distribution  of benefits  within  the village  is  a
function  of  the  extent  to  which  households  are directly  linked  into the  associational
networks, via membership and active participation.
A further test of the relative role of village-effects versus household-effects consists
of adding village-level social capital variables to the household regressions. We found that
the household-level social capital variables retain their significance while the village-level
social capital variables are not significant.  This suggests that village-level social capital
effects play little role in explaining the variance of household welfare (although they can of
course explain the variance of village welfare).
This conclusion, however, needs to be treated with caution because of the possible
existence of omitted-variable bias, in case the regression does not control for all relevant
village factors.  We try to tackle this question in two ways.  As a first approach, we added
to  the basic specification  of Table 21 a  dummy variable for  each village  (minus one
omitted village), under the assumption that these variables capture all omitted relevant
22  In a village-level  regression,  all variables  are recalculated  as village-level  averages,  with the exception  of
the location  dummy  variables.
52village factors.  This raises the R-squared from 0.42 to  only 0.47, suggesting that the
amount of potential omitted variable bias is fairly limited.  More importantly, it changes
the  coefficients  of  the  social  capital  variables  only  very  slightly  and  leaves  their
significance pattern unaffected. This suggests that our finding of significant social capital
effects at the household level is not the result of omitted variables to capture the social
capital effects at the village level.
A second and more interesting approach is to include in the regression information
on the villages'  general economic and social condition.  The village-level data files include
a number of economic variables (number of inhabitants, distance to nearest service center,
presence of all-year passable road, number of development projects in the community), as
well as a set of social and institutional variables.  When added to equation (1), none turned
out to be  significant, lending strong support to the proposition that there is no omitted
variable bias in the results discussed in this paper.
539.  SOCIAL  CAPITAL  AND  HOUSEHOLD  WELFARE:  Two-WAY  CAUSALITY?
The model underlying this paper and presented in section 6 took the fundamental position
that social capital is an input in the household's production function and can be modeled
similar to human capital and other household asset endowments.  However, like human
capital, social capital is also, at least partly, a consumption good.  This is certainly true for
participation in non-mandatory social groups pursuing leisure activities.  Since leisure is
usually a luxury good, demand for it will rise with income, and then there could be  a
reverse causality from welfare level to social capital.  If so, the estimated coefficient of
social capital in equation (1) is upward biased.
The strongest evidence in  support of a causation  from social capital to  income
comes from estimating structural equations which indicate the role of social capital in
access to services, such as credit or in determnining  collective action.  Such evidence was
presented by Narayan and Pritchett (1997) for Tanzania documenting the role of social
capital in obtaining access to agricultural inputs such as fertilizer.  Likewise, Grcotaert
(1998) documented the positive role of social capital in  access to  credit in  Indonesia.
Grootaert, Swamy  and  Oh (1998)  similarly found that  social  capital was  a  powerful
determinant in access to credit as well as in improving risk management for the household
by reducing the forced sale of assets.  In the case of Bolivia, the results presented in the
previous section show weaker evidence of the role of social capital in providing access to
credit although there is a strong role of social capital in collective action.
However, the  extent  of two-way causality is  empirically testable by  means of
instrumental variable estimation. The real challenge is to find a suitable instrument set for
social capital: instrunents  must deternine social capital but not household welfare (nor be
determined by household welfare).  In order to make this task more feasible, we limit our
attention to  the model  which  uses a  single social  capital index.  We  argue that the
following are conceptually suitable instruments for social capital:
(I)  Ethnic  and  religious diversity  of  the  village.  This  affects directly  the
potential heterogeneity of associations, which is one of the components of
the aggregate social capital index.  If there  is  only  one religion  in  the
village, it is not possible to have a religiously heterogeneous association.
There is  also  no reason  to  assume that  ethnic  or religious  composition
would affect income, nor, obviously, will income affect diversity. 23
(2)  The  density  and  democratic functioning  of  institutions  in  the  village.
Clearly,  the  possibility  for  a  given  household  to  join  an  association
increases as more associations exist in the village.  The likelihood to join
and  to be  active in  the association can also be  expected to  increase as
institutions are perceived to function democratically.  As we have already
23  This  position  is not inconsistent  with  the possibility  that ethnic diversity  may affect  economic  growth  at
the national level (as has been shown for Africa by Easterly and Levine, 1995, and Collier, 1998).
54demonstrated earlier, the density of associations at the village level does not
significantly affect the level of household expenditure directly.
(3)  The  extent  of  community  involvement  in  the  creation  of  grassroots
organizations.  Where a community is perceived to be actively involved in
the creation of local organizations, it may increase the level of trust in the
association and hence make it more likely  that households will join  the
association.  This  variable is  the  village  equivalent of  the  community
orientation variable which we used in  the household regression.  As our
earlier results indicate, the village variable does not have a direct impact on
the level of household expenditure.
Given the  content of the available village data file, this  leads to  four possible
instruments: an index of ethnic and religious diversity, the number of existing associations
in the village, an index capturing whether leaders of the three most important associations
are  elected democratically, and  an  index  capturing whether the  three most  important
associations were originated by the community. 24
We added those 4 variables to equation (1) and found that none were significant.
Hence they meet  the first criterion for being a  valid instrument, namely not  affecting
household welfare.  To test the second criterion, we applied the test for over-identifying
restrictions proposed  by  Davidson  and  MacKinnon (1993).  This  tests  the joint  null
hypothesis that  the underlying model  (equation (1) is  correctly specified  and that  the
applied  instruments  are  valid.  (The  latter  hypothesis  cannot  be  tested  separately.)
Table 31 reports the test-statistic's p-value as well as the coefficient and t-statistic of the
social capital index in the 2SLS equation. To check for the sensitivity of results to specific
instrument  selection,  we  tested  several  combinations  of  the  instruments.  Although
increases in  the R-squared  in the  first stage equation are modest, all combinations of
instruments pass the over-identifying restrictions test.
In all cases, the instrumental variables method leads to higher coefficients (ranging
from 0.0153 to 0.0177) for the social capital index than in the OLS model (where it was
0.0057).  This indicates that equation (1) is correctly specified and that social capital is an
exogenous determinant of household welfare.  If there were significant reverse causality,
the coefficient of the social capital index in the 2SLS regression would have been lower
than the OLS coefficient.  This outcome is the same as that  reported by Narayan and
Pritchett (1997) for Tanzania, by Grootaert (1999) for Indonesia, and by Grootaert, Oh and
Swamy (1999) for Burkina Faso.
The higher coefficient of the instrumented social capital index implies that a 10%
increase in the household's social capital endowment leads to a 3.6% to 4.2% increase in
household expenditure per capita.  This is significantly larger than the effect from a 10%
24  It is important  to point out that these variables  were collected  independently  of the household  data, by
means  of interviews  with village  leaders,  teachers,  health professionals,  etc., and also with focus  groups
of households  who  did not answer  the household  questionnaire.
55increase in the human capital endowment, which would increase household expenditure
per capita by 1.6%.
Table  31:  Social Capital  and Household  Welfare:  Instrumental  Variables  Results
Social Capital Index  Incremental  OIR Test
Instrument Set  Coefficient  t-statistic  R-squared  p-value
.I  Diversity, institutional density,
democratic functioning,
community  initiation  0.0177  2.18  0.024  0.97
2.  Institutional  density,  democratic
functioning,  community  initiation  0.0166  1.91  0.021  0.'3
3.  Tnstitutional  density,  community
initiation  0.0153  1.62  0.018  0.  87
This  finding strengthens the case for viewing social capital  as an  input in  the
household's  production function.  This in turn opens up the case for investing in social
capital, just  as  investments are made  in human  capital.  However, there  is  a  critical
difference:  education is embodied in one individual and can be acquired by one individual
regardless of what other people do.  By definition, social capital can only be acquired by a
group of people and requires a form of cooperation among them (although, as our results
have shown, the extent to which different members of a group capture the benefits does
depend upon their individual actions, especially the extent of active participation through
meeting attendance and contributions).  This gives social capital an inevitable public good
character and this has implications for its production (Coleman, 1988, 1990). In particular,
like all public goods, it will tend to be  underproduced relative to  the  social optimum,
unless  the  group  responsible  for  its  production  can  fully  internalize  the  externality
involved.  Which group is best suited to producing social capital thus depends largely oTI
the scope of the created externality and this determines the size of the group needed to
internalize it  effectively  and  avoid free rides.  For example, in  the case  of  farmers'
associations, the scope is local; in the case of the rule of law, it is national and the central
government needs to play the essential role.
However, the case of Bolivia also illustrates the importance of the linkages between
the local associations and the municipal and regional government.  The agrarian syndicates
which were set up originally by the government have, over time, come to be perceived as
community-oriented by many of the respondents in  the study.  In part this  reflects the
important role which these syndicates have played as a communication channel between
the community and the local and regional level of government.  Both functions --  the
creation of social capital among the members of the association and the linkage with other
associations and with  government  -are  the channels through which they benefit their
members and the community.
5610.  SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSION
Bolivia is characterized by a large number and variety of local level institutions. We found
67 different types of local associations.  On average, households belong to 1.4 groups and
associations.  The landscape of local institutions is dominated by the presence of agrarian
syndicates which  were  created by  government  decree  in  1952 but  now  are viewed
primarily as community-initiated institutions to manage communal resources.  As part of
the  Law  of  Popular  Participation,  these  are  territorial  organizations  that  have  been
registered as legal entities to work closely with municipalities to represent the interests and
priorities of local people in municipal decision making.
Of the total number of memberships, 45% were  in agrarian syndicates, 12% in
production groups, 9% in social service groups, and 7% in education and health groups
with smaller numbers belonging to religious and government groups.  Overall, 14% of the
memberships were  in NGO-initiated groups and another 8% in  other supra-community
groups.  These included cross-community syndicate groups, trade and sports associations.
In terms of  gender, memberships in  men-only groups were  the most  frequent (43%),
followed by memberships in mixed groups (37%) and in women-only groups (20%).  The
latter tended to be the most frequent in areas where NGOs had been active, particularly in
Charagua and Villa Serrano.
The  issue of the  role of local  level  institutions was probed  in  different ways.
Tabulation of which among the 67 groups households considered as the most important,
revealed  that  agrarian  syndicates ranked  first,  41%,  followed by  non-denominational
NGOs, 14%. Except for NGOs and religious groups, a majority of households said that the
groups were initiated by the community and had formal status in the communities.  There
is  still a  strong communal orientation in  the communities studied.  When asked why
households had joined the groups that they had rated the most important, approximately
50% said it was because of the positive impact on the community.  Overall, 25% said that
they had joined to improve household welfare.  Households reported many benefits from
belonging to groups.  These included increased access to education services, water supply
and sanitation, electricity, irrigation, agriculture technology, land and forest rights, credit
and savings.
In many areas agrarian syndicates rotate  leadership among households.  While
some writers consider this to be a drawback, this practice has led to the inclusion of the
poor in leadership roles.  Across the study sample, 51% of the poorest households reported
having been in leadership positions in groups and associations.  On the other hand, we did
find  evidence  that  suggests that  in  some  areas  the  poor  are  excluded  from  active
membership in the syndicates.
In addition to community-based groups, supra-community or linkage organizations
that  work  across communities have important roles  to  play in  linking  groups and in
collective bargaining.  In this  study, we  found that  8% of memberships were in  such
organizations.  Although  numerically  small, these  organizations play  critical  roles  in
57shifting basic power relations between community groups and the state, represented by the
municipality.
There were  important differences  in  the patterning  of  institutions  in  the  four
municipalities.  In Mizque which has the highest per capita expenditure, almost everyone
was an active member of agrarian syndicates.  This was also true for Tiahuanacu with a
93% membership rate.  By contrast, only 18%  of households in Charagua and 48% of
households in Villa Serrano were active in the syndicates.  To substitute, in these two
municipalities, households belong instead to a variety of production groups, social service
and  health  and  education  groups.  We  found  that  the  four  municipalities  could be
distinguished along two dimensions:  strength of traditional institutions on the one hand,
and  effective  municipal  government  and  supra-community  leadership  or  linkage
organizations, on the other hand.  Mizque and Tiahuanacu have a  strong  institutional
tradition, while Villa Serrano and Charagua have weak traditional institutions.  We also
found that Charagua and Mizque were characterized by strong regional  leadership and
effective municipal government while Tiahuanacu and Villa Serrano were characterized by
ineffective municipal government and weak regional leadership.  It is important to note
that Mizque had the highest per capita expenditure and Villa Serrano the lowest per capita
expenditure. This pattern is the result of the interaction of historical factors with the nature
of society and long-term interventions by outside actors such as NGOs.
In this paper we estimated empirically the impact of social capital on household
welfare and poverty in  Bolivia.  The focus was  on households'  memberships in  local
associations  -an  aspect of social capital that is particularly relevant for households' day-
to-day decisions which affect their welfare and consumption.
We used a reduced-forrn model of household welfare, which controls for relevant
household and  location characteristics, to  estimate the contribution of  social capital to
household welfare.  The underlying structural equations treat social capital as an input,
together with human and physical capital, in the household's  production function.  The
effects  of  social  capital  operate  through  (at  least)  three  mechanisms:  sharing  of
information  among  association  members,  reduction  of  opportunistic  behavior,  and
improved collective decision making. The magnitude of the social capital effect was found
to  be  about  2.5  times  larger  than  that  of  human  capital.  Increasing  the  average
endowments of education for each adult in the household by one year (which is about a
25% increase) would  increase  household expenditure per  capita by  4.2%.  A  similar
increase in social capital endowment would increase household expenditure per capita by
9% to 10.5%.
We measured social capital along six dimensions: density of memberships, internal
heterogeneity  of  associations  (by  gender,  age,  education,  religion,  etc.),  meeting
attendance, active participation in decision making, payment of dues (in cash and in kind),
and community orientation. Among these, the strongest effect was found to come from the
number of memberships.  An active membership in an agrarian syndicate is associated on
average with an 11.5% higher household expenditure per capita. A membership in another
local association is associated with a 5.3% higher expenditure level.  However, our results
also  suggest  that households  who participate actively  in  the  association  by  attending
58meetings frequently and by making larger contributions in cash or in kind benefit more
than others.  We also found that households who are primarily members of community-
initiated organizations obtain larger benefits, but this effect was quite small.  A distinct
feature of associational life in Bolivia is that the poor household groups participate more
actively in decision making.  This was especially observed in Mizque and Charagua.
The four study zones in our data set have a different institutional tradition as well
as different strengths of regional leadership and municipal government.  We found these
features to be related to the impact of social capital at the household level.  Specifically, in
Mizque where membership in agrarian syndicates is almost universal, the impact of other
local associations on household welfare is very small.  In order to benefit, households need
to participate actively in  the associations by attending their meetings. Mizque also has
strong linkage organizations, social cohesion and a strong municipal government.  In Villa
Serrano and  Charagua, where the  institutional tradition is  weaker, we  found a  strong
impact of membership both in agrarian syndicates and other associations on household
welfare.  Over and  above this,  active participation in the  association and  community
initiation were found to be important variables.  In Charagua, the linkage organizations are
strong as is the municipal government, and the traditional organizational structures are
being revived through the Guarani Assembly which has already become a political force in
some areas.
Social capital reduces the probability to be  poor,  and the returns to  household
investment in social capital are generally higher for the poor than for the rich.  The effect
of the aggregate social capital index was about one-third larger at the 10 h percentile of the
distribution than at the 90th percentile.  This was primarily due to membership in agrarian
syndicates which had the largest impact between the 25th percentile and the median of the
distribution, while the impact of membership in other local organizations was the strongest
in the bottom quartile of the distribution.  Likewise, the benefits from membership are
higher  for  households  with  little  land than  for  those  with  more  land.  The poorest
households in Bolivia are actually members of more non-syndicate organizations than the
rich and our results indicate that this investment is warranted.  It exceeds the returns to
education and other assets quite significantly.
Social capital is hypothesized to have several long-term benefits, such as better
access to  credit  and a  resulting better  ability to  smoothen out  income  fluctuations by
borrowing and/or accumulating assets.  Our empirical results partially confirm the validity
of these propositions.  Households with higher levels of social capital are significantly
more successful in accumulating household durables which suggests that they have been
better able to smoothen out their consumption over time.  Our results also provide direct
evidence that these households have the highest probability of increasing their savings. On
the other hand, we found only weak evidence that households which are well integrated in
the network of local associations have better access to credit.  We found the latter to be
primarily a function of location, with access to credit being strongest in Mizque.  We also
found that households with many memberships in local associations and who frequently
attend their meetings are more likely to participate in collective action.  Households with
strong ties in local associations also have a higher level of trust in their community as a
source of assistance in case of need.
59Social capital affects household welfare but  there can also be  reverse causality:
richer households could have a higher demand for memberships in associations and have
more time  to participate  (although the  opportunity cost  of  their time  is  also higher).
Instrumental variable estimation suggested that the direct effect of social capital on welfare
dominates the reverse effect in explaining the correlation between the two variables.  This
finding is robust for several sets of instruments available in the data.
Historical evidence also strengthens this interpretation.  Agrarian syndicates were
created almost 50 years ago  in a  situation of  widespread poverty.  Although  this was
accompanied by land reform, indigenous people did not get clear title over their land as did
the elite.  In areas where the haciendas were not broken up, other groups and organizations
evolved to help people cope with inequitable distribution of assets and limited economic
and social opportunity.
Thus, on balance, this study for Bolivia found compelling empirical evidence that
local social capital - defined as household membership in local associations  -makes  a
significant contribution to household welfare, over and above that stemming from human
capital and other household assets.
Policy Implications
Our findings support a policy by governments, non-government organizations and donors
to  invest in  social capital  - either  directly or  indirectly by  creating an  environment
friendly to the emergence of local associations. Our findings also indicate that investments
in local social capital deserve to be part of poverty alleviation programs since the returns to
investment in social capital are larger for the poor than for others.
However, policy prescriptions to support social capital formation of the type that
reduces poverty in the context  of social polarization have to be  nuanced and take into
account the  local  social  relations  and  power  structures both  in  informal  and  formal
organizations.  Not all institutions are equally inclusive or serve the needs of the poor.
Institutions are  embedded  in  history,  culture  and  politics.  All  of  these  need  to  be
understood to avoid the simplistic prescription of  'create local groups'.  The creation of
local associations in the context of Bolivia's ongoing decentralization process also requires
a balanced approach to capacity building of both local government and local associations.
There is  a danger to overloading task and programs on communities before they have
honed their skills to work effectively in municipal decision making.  This is in fact already
happening and will be counter-productive.
Given  the  radical  changes  in  governance,  democracy  and  laws  supporting
grassroots involvement in municipal government, we offer five specific recomrnendations
for the Bolivian context.
First, the  delivery  of basic  local infrastructure and  basic health  and  education
services should take into account the social structure and social inequities in designing of
strategies to create participatory groups and associations.  Processes that build inclusive
social capital (i.e., including the poor and both men and women) at the local level in the
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well as increase the sustainability of these services.  Funds to support these social and
institutional processes need to be an integral part of project financing in exactly the same
way as financing of physical construction.
Second,  the  country-wide  processes  of  local  participation  and  municipal
decentralization need to be fine-tuned in recognition of the fact that they depend on local
level social capital.  In this context, the Bolivian government needs to monitor the social
composition of vigilance committees and the density, composition and strength of both
solidarity groups and supra-community linkage groups in local communities.  Given the
dangers of cooption of the vigilance committees by political parties, this monitoring will
help  refine  municipal  procedures  and  perhaps  even  election  procedures.  It  is  also
important that data be  gender disaggregated.  Several writers have noted that territorial
organizations tend to be dominated by men.  In fact, even at the municipal level, as rural
councils were given resources, the number of women councilors declined as more men
became interested in what was perceived to be potentially powerful positions.
Third,  as  is  already  being done,  technical  assistance needs  to  be  provided to
grassroots organizations and vigilance committees and people need to be educated about
the new laws and their rights.  Technical assistance is also needed at the municipal level.
Given the scale of the program, NGOs and other external support agencies have a role to
play in technical assistance, both as links to outside resources and in the training of local
organizations to fulfil their mandates without being coopted by the state.  However, NGOs
may have their own agenda, which may or may not be best suited for local empowerment
strategies. Cross-linking or supra-community  NGOs that stay in the region for a long time
have important roles to play.  As is now being done in other countries, local organizations
should be  able to  choose their partners from  among NGOs where  they exist and buy
needed technical assistance as part of grant programs funded through various channels.
Fourth, to transforrn the social capital of the poor from  a coping strategy to  a
productive  strategy  will  require  investments  in  increasing  poor  people's  access  to
productive assets, economic opportunity, education and credit.
Fifth, although groups and associations can be counted, the processes used in these
groups, including  rotation  of  leadership,  leads  to  the  acquisition  of  new  skills  and
behaviors and new social connections.  The social learning that takes place is probably as
important as the direct benefits received by members.  It is this  social characteristic of
groups that makes social capital different from other forms of capital.
61ANNEX:  MEANS  AND STANDARD DEVIATION  OF REGRESSION  VARIABLES
Total  Tiahuanacu  Villa Serrano  Mizaue  Charagua
Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard
I Deviation  Deviation  _  Deviation  Deviation  Deviation
Log (household expenditure per capita)  7.33  0.65  7.30  0.60  7.11  0.63  7.61  0.63  7.29  0.64
Asset Ownership Score  0.63  0.50  0.74  0.49  0.52  0.48  0.68  0.54  0.57  0.47
Proportion of Poor Households  0.18  0.38  0.16  0.37  0.28  0.45  0.08  0.27  0.19  0.37
Collective Action  8.87  13.48  13.27  19.54  7.15  10.97  6.94  8.28  8.16  11.56
Increased Savings  0.09  0.29  0.08  0.27  0.12  0.32  0.09  0.28  0.10  0.30
Obtained Credit  0.21  0.41  0.19  0.39  0.24  0.43  0.28  0.45  0.16  0.36
Community Assistance  0.14  0.35  0.02  0.14  0.16  0.37  0.11  0.32  0.27  0.45
Social  Capital Index
Multiplicative index  18.89  17.32  26.46  22.07  21.36  18.65  15.00  10.44  12.75  11.96
Additive index  23.56  12.91  27.61  8.95  21.60  13.31  26.85  11.38  18.17  14.90
Social  Capital Dimensions
Membership in agrarian syndicates  0.63  0.48  0.88  0.33  0.57  0.50  0.90  0.30  0.18  0.38
Number of other memberships  0.77  0.91  0.84  0.90  0.95  1.09  0.33  0.63  0.95  0.83
Heterogeneity index  56.50  27.34  73.46  16.05  59.33  32.52  50.04  18.65  43.16  28.61
Meeting attendance  4.58  5.12  3.68  2.85  4.45  4.56  5.21  4.32  5.00  7.49
Index of participation  74.84  35.68  86.37  22.54  63.43  38.70  84.43  28.16  65.13  43.12
Index of contribution  3.77  7.62  4.71  7.96  1.38  3.58  4.56  6.95  4.42  10.05
ComTnunity orientation  60.45  43.44  72.97  35.87  52.88  43.16  73.30  40.82  42.63  45.36
Household Size  4.98  2.35  4.15  2.34  4.93  2.07  4.82  2.01  6.02  2.54
Years of Education  3.90  2.81  3.57  3.15  3.33  2.50  3.67  2.57  5.04  2.66
Female Head of Household  0.13  0.34  0.22  0.42  0.08  0.27  0.12  0.33  0.09  0.29
Age of Head of Household  45.97  15.03  52.17  16.55  44.42  12.64  43.37  14.87  43.94  14.12
Age of Head of Household Squared  2339.0  1530.6  2994.2  1829.9  2131.8  1174.6  2101.0  1478.9  2128.9  1381.6
Non-Farmer Household  0.16  0.36  0.16  0.37  0.12  0.32  0.11  0.32  0.24  0.43
Land Ownership (hectare)  3.41  11.15  3.46  3.92  3.43  7.33  2.08  2.62  4.66  20.47
Animal Ownership (number)  19.47  31.36  21.17  15.68  17.84  24.52  16.05  31.16  22.81  45.81
Farm Equipment Ownership (number)  0.46  0.53  0.80  0.42  0.52  0.51  0.46  0.55  0.04  0.30
Tiahuanacu  0.25  0.43  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Villa Serrano  0.25  0.43  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Mizque  0.25  0.43  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Charagua  0.25  0.43  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00
Municipality's  Capital City  0.10  0.30  0.10  0.30  0.10  0.30  0.10  0.30  0.10  0.30
Castellano  0.40  0.49  0.06  0 23  0.96  0.21  0.02  0.14  0.58  0.49
Aymara  0.24  0.42  0.94  0.23  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Quechua  0.26  0.44  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.21  0.98  0.14  0.00  0.00
Guarani  0.11  0.31  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.42  0.49
Village Proportion - Non-Castellano  0.60  0.41  0.94  0.09  0.04  0.10  0.98  0.05  0.42  0.22REFERENCES
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